Facts
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While on patrol around 3:00 a.m. in February 2021, Officer James Marshall observed a car in the parking lot of Dreamland Inn with someone in the driver’s seat and the engine running. Dreamland is known for drugs, prostitution, and other criminal activity. In 2020 alone, the police department received over 74 citizen complaints concerning Dreamland. After surveilling for several minutes and seeing no activity, Marshall ran the license plate and learned it was registered to a local address. He watched for another five-and-a-half minutes. Finding the driver’s behavior suspicious, Marshall parked behind the car and approached to question the driver. Bodycam footage begins at this point.
After introducing himself, Marshall explained that he had observed Rodney Rucker lingering in the car and that this was a “high area . . . for like narcotics, prostitution, and stuff like that.” Rucker asked who called him in, and Marshall told him nobody had—he had just noticed Rucker while on patrol. Marshall asked Rucker if he was staying at the hotel. Rucker said he was in room 105 and explained he was warming up the car because it was cold. He was wearing a t-shirt and continuously rubbed his hands together throughout the encounter.
His car was visibly full of clothes, bags, and a bike. When Marshall asked Rucker for identification, Rucker claimed he did not have his driver’s license. Marshall asked if he knew his social security number; Rucker said he did not. Marshall asked for his name and Rucker gave only “Rodney.” Marshall asked for his last name and birth date. The following dialogue ensued:
Rucker: “What’s the reason?”
Marshall: “I just told you.”
Rucker: “…There ain’t no reason….”
Marshall: “What we always do, is when we see people sitting in their vehicles, we get out with them, man, and make sure everything is on the up and up.”
Rucker: “You know it’s cold, right? I’m getting the vehicle ready.”. . .
Marshall: “I get everything you’re saying . . . Now I’m just asking you to identify yourself.”
Rucker continued to refuse to identify himself. At this point, Marshall ordered Rucker to exit his car. Rucker refused and rolled up his window. Marshall told Rucker if he didn’t open the door Marshall would get him out. Rucker became agitated, rolling his window up and down and yelling that Marshall was “violating me already.” Further commands and refusals followed. During the exchange, Officer William Carter arrived. Marshall told him Rucker “still hasn’t identified himself, look at the white powder on his nose, plus he had white powder on his pants.” Rucker responded that the white powder “could be anything.”
Rucker continued to yell and refused numerous commands from both officers to exit the still running car. Both officers warned him that, if he didn’t get out, then things could go badly. Marshall then called for Officer Terreous Johnson to come to the scene while Carter stepped away to call Lt. Jenkins. Carter asked Jenkins whether they had the right to break Rucker’s window. Jenkins presumably said they did because Carter then told Marshall that, once Johnson arrived with a baton, they would break the window. The officers believed this was necessary because the car appeared to be locked.
When Johnson arrived, Marshall again ordered Rucker out of the car. Sixteen seconds elapsed during which Johnson warned Rucker this was his last chance. Johnson then broke the window, after which Marshall opened the door and removed Rucker. They took Rucker to the ground, cuffed him, and stood him back up in less than a minute. Marshall repeated that Rucker had white powder on his nose and lap. This time, Rucker responded it was “oil.” The officers searched Rucker and his car, finding no drugs but discovering his driver’s license in his front pocket. Marshall arrested Rucker for failure to comply and resisting arrest. Carter took Rucker to the station where he failed a drug test. The test noted Rucker refused blood and urine sampling, was swaying, and had bloodshot eyes, white powdery substance in both nasal cavities, and an orange tongue. Carter added a DUI charge. All charges were dismissed, though, when Marshall did not appear in court because he was sick with COVID.
Rucker filed this suit in June 2022, bringing claims against Officers Marshall, Carter, and Johnson, as well as the City of Senatobia. The district court granted summary judgment to the City but denied it to the officers. The 5th reversed, granting qualified immunity to the officers.
Analysis
A. Reasonable suspicion for stop
Multiple undisputed facts demonstrate Marshall’s reasonable suspicion to approach Rucker. First, Marshall had over seven years of law enforcement experience and had made numerous arrests at Dreamland in his three months working for the Senatobia Police Department. See Flowers (holding “courts must consider the facts in light of the officer’s experience” of 10 years when considering “reasonable suspicion”); and Hill (acknowledging officer’s testimony that he was present for two arrests at the specific complex presented “relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis”)
Second, Marshall observed Rucker at this suspicious location at an unusual hour of the night after 2:00 a.m., when the overwhelming majority of law-abiding citizens are at home in bed. See Michelletti and Byrd (finding reasonable suspicion because the defendant was out at midnight in a high crime area).
Third, Marshall learned that Rucker’s plate was registered to a local address. Other courts have found that a local individual staying at a hotel raises suspicion. See United States v. McIntyre, 384 F. App’x 805 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding officer reasonably suspected criminal activity because the vehicle was traveling through the parking lot of a hotel at 2:30 a.m. even though it was registered to an individual with a local address”); United States v. Garza, 125 F. App’x 927 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding reasonable suspicion to knock on suspect’s hotel room door because she provided a local address, did not have a reservation for the room, and paid in cash).
Finally, Rucker was idling in a running car in a high crime area. We have repeatedly held that idling in such areas contributes to an officer’s reasonable suspicion. See Roper (the relevant characteristics of a location can contribute to a finding of reasonable suspicion; Bass (reasonable suspicion existed where a vehicle was parked in front of a store with a known history of narcotics-related activity in a high-crime area).
Our decision in Flowers is illustrative. There, an officer observed the defendants idling in a car outside a convenience store in a notoriously crime-ridden neighborhood, at night. Several officers, all in separate patrol cars, converged upon the defendants’ vehicle with their blue lights activated such that it would have been impossible for the defendants to leave the parking lot. We held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to approach the defendants’ car in this manner.
Rucker responds that Flowers is distinguishable because Dreamland is not a high crime area. Under Flowers, he claims, such a finding requires a series of recent arrests for violent crimes and burglaries. He posits the 74 calls in 2020 about Dreamland really show only two narcotics reports and a single prostitution report during the prior year. We disagree. Courts generally accept officers’ testimony about whether an area is one with a high incidence of criminal activity. In Flowers itself, we accepted that the area was high crime based on the officer’s belief and testimony.
Finally, we note that—again, according to the video evidence— Marshall’s actions subsequent to the initial stop were also reasonable. That is, his encounter with Rucker lasted no longer than was necessary to dispel his reasonable suspicion until further reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, emerged. The initial stop, where Marshall approached Rucker’s car and asked him to identify himself, lasted only 35 seconds. These actions were proportionate to the suspicion Marshall had at that point. Rucker’s subsequent refusal to identify himself or exit his vehicle legitimately increased Marshall’s suspicion. See Kokesh (defendant’s failure to identify himself contributed to officer’s reasonable suspicion). Furthermore, Rucker’s nervously rubbing his hands together throughout the encounter also supported reasonable suspicion. See Jefferson (suspect’s looking around nervously and shaking hands contributed to reasonable suspicion).
In sum, contrary to the district court’s ruling, the video evidence plainly shows that Marshall had reasonable suspicion to stop and question Rucker. Marshall was therefore entitled to qualified immunity on the unlawful seizure claim.
B. Arrest
Marshall had probable cause to arrest Rucker for two reasons. First, Mississippi law requires someone operating a motor vehicle to display his license “upon demand of a . . . peace officer” or else face “imprisonment in the county jail.” Miss. Code Ann. §§ 63-1-41, 69; see also Lewis v. State, 831 So. 2d 553 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (defining operating the vehicle as sitting behind the wheel, in control with the motor running.).
Second, Mississippi law requires individuals to obey a police officer’s lawful commands—e.g., to identify oneself or exit one’s vehicle—where a breach of the peace may otherwise occur, and officers may arrest someone who refuses. See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-35-7.
In sum, contrary to the district court’s ruling, the undisputed video evidence shows Marshall had probable cause to arrest Rucker. Marshall is therefore entitled to qualified immunity on that claim as well.
C. Arrest was retaliation
Our court has repeatedly explained that a police officer is protected by qualified immunity against a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim if probable cause existed . . . or if reasonable police officers could believe probable cause existed. See Roy.
As discussed, Marshall had probable cause to arrest Rucker under Mississippi law. That means Marshall is protected by qualified immunity as to Rucker’s retaliatory arrest claim. The district court erred in concluding otherwise.
D. Excessive Force
We have repeatedly held that noncompliance or continued physical resistance justifies the use of force. The undisputed facts—again, as plainly shown by the video evidence—fall easily within these precedents. Rucker refused officer commands to get out of his car at least 20 times. The officers then gave him two final warnings before breaking the window sixteen seconds later. Once Rucker was cuffed, the officers ceased all use of force at once. This use of force was objectively reasonable.
In response, Rucker points to Deville, arguing it supports his argument that the officers used excessive force. We disagree. In Deville, officers stopped Deville for speeding and ordered her out of the car because she complained about the stop. She refused to exit because her two-year-old granddaughter was in the back seat and her husband was on the way. The officers threatened to call child protective services to take the child, and then broke her window, dragged Deville out, threw her against the car, and cuffed her. Deville sustained serious injuries that required multiple surgeries. We held a jury could find this amounted to excessive force.
This case is quite different. For instance, Rucker was a young man suspiciously lingering in a high crime area in a running car at 3:00 a.m., whereas Deville was a grandmother (with her infant granddaughter in the back seat) pulled over for going 10 miles over the speed limit in broad daylight. Rucker refused to identify himself, whereas Deville produced her registration. Rucker was ordered out his car because of the potentially dangerous situation; Deville, only because she voiced displeasure at the stop. Rucker had one cut that required a stitch; Deville suffered serious injuries. Thus, Deville does not support that the officers used unreasonable force here.
In sum, the video evidence plainly shows the officers did not use excessive force in extracting Rucker from his car and arresting him. The officers are therefore entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.
E. Bystander liability
Finally, the officers argue that the district court erroneously failed to grant summary judgment dismissing Rucker’s bystander liability claim against Carter. We agree. This claim was premised on Rucker’s claims for unlawful arrest and excessive force by the other officers. We have already ruled that all of those claims fail and must be dismissed. Accordingly, Rucker’s bystander liability claim against Carter necessarily fails as well.
Conclusion
The officers are entitled to qualified immunity on all claims. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment and REMAND for entry of summary judgment in favor of the officers.
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/23/23-60557-CV0.pdf