Facts
The Crockett Police Department received a call that a man was sprawled on the ground in a residential area. When officers arrived on the scene, they spotted a group of concerned neighbors gathered around a 400-pound man. The large man was thrashing about on the grass near the road in nothing but torn underwear. That man was Xavier Leonard. And it is obvious from the officers’ bodycam videos that Leonard was in dire straits. His body was bloodied and bruised. And his only response to questioning was to grunt and flail. After the officers struggled for a few minutes to keep Leonard from smashing his head on the pavement, someone noted that Leonard smelled like PCP.
Officer Kerri Bell, a former EMT who had taken charge of the situation, agreed: “He’s high. Super high. Meanwhile, Deputy Juan Noyola arrived. Deputy Noyola was not part of Crockett PD. He was from the Houston County Sherriff’s Office. Deputy Noyola, who had grown up in the area, identified Leonard. A woman present at the scene claimed Leonard was her neighbor and that she had never seen him act this way before. With Deputy Noyola’s help, the officers realized that Leonard’s home was just down the street. So Deputy Noyola went to look around.
Deputy Noyola noticed that a side door to the house had been left open. He radioed Officer Bell, who went to assist. Deputy Noyola knocked on the open door and announced: “Crockett PD!” Silence. Drawing her weapon, Officer Bell peeked through the cracked door. The inside of the home was in disarray. Among other things, Officer Bell could see a broken coffee table. The officers entered. Officer Bell proceeded room by room, shouting, “Police Department, if you’re in here, make yourself known!” Upon entering the main bedroom, she spotted a gun on the bed. She then opened the closet. “Marijuana plants,” she murmured. In the next bedroom, she found a tent with marijuana plants and multiple containers for PCP or meth. Officer Bell then announced that she would check the remainder of the potential hiding spots in the home for safety, and then they would get out. The officers were in the home for under two minutes.
Officer Bell then prepared an application for a search warrant. For safety, she explained, and to ensure there were no suspects hiding or further victims in need of immediate medical attention, the deputy and I made entry into the residence through the open door. A state judge signed the warrant to search for narcotics, contraband, cash, and firearms. Law enforcement searched Leonard’s home and seized, inter alia, marijuana plants, marijuana, other drugs, cash, and two guns.
Leonard was charged with one count of possession of a firearm by a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Leonard wanted his attorney to move to suppress the fruits of the search of his home. But the attorney told Leonard that would be frivolous. After the attorney informed the court, the court appointed Leonard a new attorney. Leonard’s new attorney filed the motion to suppress.
A magistrate judge held a hearing and issued a report recommending that the district court grant Leonard’s motion. The district court adopted the magistrate’s recommendation and suppressed the evidence. The Government appealed. On appeal, it does not contest the merits of the Fourth Amendment issue. It argues only that the exclusionary rule does not apply. The 5th reversed (evidence not suppressed).
Analysis
The exclusionary rule is a disfavored judge-made remedy, which should be used only as a “last resort. See SCOTUS Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006). It also has many exceptions. For example, unlawfully obtained evidence might nevertheless be admissible under the good faith exception. See SCOTUS United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The good faith exception has several offshoots. Relevant here, is our court’s “close enough” doctrine. See Massi. Evidence is admissible if the officer’s conduct that led to the information in the warrant affidavit was “‘close enough to the line of validity’ that an objectively reasonable officer . . . would believe that the information” gathered “was not tainted by unconstitutional conduct.” That standard is susceptible to valid criticism. But it is what it is.
No matter how we define that “close enough” standard, it’s clearly met here. A large man was half-naked and thrashing about on the ground in a residential neighborhood. He was bruised and bloodied. The people nearby did not know Leonard; they knew only that he had come stumbling up the road before falling. The man himself lacked the wherewithal to offer any further explanation, such as whether he was attacked or was suffering from a medical crisis. All he could do was groan in apparent pain and torment in response to questioning. The officers sought to care for the man in his disturbed and pitiable condition by protecting his head from smashing against the ground and calling emergency medical services. The officers eventually determined that the man’s house was nearby. When they went over to look, they noticed a door to that house had been left open. Through that door, the officers could see a broken coffee table, suggesting a violent struggle had occurred inside. Before entering, they knocked and announced their presence as required under the Fourth Amendment. They heard only silence. So they entered.
It doesn’t matter whether the officers entered Leonard’s home to clear the area of Leonard’s possible attacker, identify other potential victims of an attack, or to find someone with information that could help with Leonard’s medical care. Any of those reasons could qualify as an exigent circumstance. The “mere possibility” that an assailant, victim, or critical medical information was inside the home won’t always satisfy the Fourth Amendment, but the officers could have reasonably believed it was enough here given the circumstances.
That reasonable belief is all that’s required under the “close enough” variant of the good faith exception. REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/23/23-40652-CR0.pdf