Facts
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On September 12, 2025, Andrew Foulds, a City of Rosenberg police officer, stopped Shannan Soward’s vehicle, reasoning that she had violated the Texas Transportation Code by failing to signal a lane change and by not yielding to an emergency vehicle. Utilizing a pre-printed form and an electronic signature device to issue a citation for the latter offense, Foulds requested Soward’s signature, informing her that that signing was “not an admission of guilt, just a promise to appear.” According to Soward, she then asked for a pen or stylus so that “she could annotate her signature” by adding other verbiage. At that point, Soward alleges, Foulds became hostile, told her to just use your finger, questioned what are you writing, and demanded the electronic signature device back. When Soward then expressed that she felt forced to sign, Foulds immediately threatened her with arrest, stating, ‘If you don’t sign it, I got to take you to jail.’” Soward then signed the device with the notation “By: Shannon Reneace Soward, under threat, duress, and coercion.”
In response, Foulds erased Soward’s signature in front of her, stating, “That’s not going to cut it for a signature,” and forced her to sign again in the manner he dictated. Also, according to Soward: Foulds escalated by asking about Soward’s 19-year-old son who was present in the car, questioning whether someone could pick him up if she was arrested. When Soward answered no, he stated, “Then I would advise signing this. If you don’t, that means I don’t know if you are going to pay the ticket—I mean, take care of it—which means I’m going to have to take you to jail. Period.” This shows coercion through intimidation and misrepresentation.
Soward signed a second time under threat, duress, and coercion. Officer Foulds acknowledged that she could notify the judge, then gave her a pre-printed citation that did not contain her signature, indicating that the original notation had been deleted.
Soward sued Foulds under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983. The district court dismissed and the 5th affirmed.
Analysis
The allegations of Soward’s complaint fail to state a viable legal claim under the Fourth Amendment. The law is settled that, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, a traffic stop entails a “seizure” of the driver. Pursuant to Terry, the legality of police investigatory stops is tested in two parts. Courts first examine whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and then inquire whether the officer’s subsequent actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop.
For a traffic stop to be justified at its inception, an officer must have an objectively reasonable suspicion that some sort of illegal activity, such as a traffic violation, occurred, or is about to occur, before stopping the vehicle. A driver’s failure to timely signal a lane change and failure to yield to an emergency vehicle, as required by Texas law, provide the requisite reasonable suspicion. Tex. Trans. Code § 545.104(b) (signal lane change); § 545.156 (yielding to an emergency vehicle).
As to whether the officer’s subsequent actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop, Soward challenges Foulds’ coercive use of arrest threats to force her signature, the erasure of her notation that she was signing under threat, duress, and coercion, and the use of her 19-year-old son’s situation to increase pressure to comply.
But Soward identifies no legal authority. Notably, both the Texas Transportation Code and the Fourth Amendment generally authorize warrantless arrests for traffic offenses committed in the arresting officer’s presence. See Tex. Trans. Code § 543.001 (“Any peace officer may arrest without warrant a person committing a violation of this [‘Rules of the Road’] subtitle [§§ 541.001–600.004].”); § 542.301(a) The Texas Transportation Code also permits police officers to issue a “written notice to appear in court,” in lieu of making a custodial arrest (which requires promptly taking the arrestee before a magistrate), for traffic violations punishable as a misdemeanor. See Tex. Trans. Code § 543.003. But avoiding custodial arrest and being “immediately taken before a magistrate” requires that the person charged “make a written promise to appear in court by signing a written notice prepared by the arresting officer.” §543.005.
In short, Soward complains that Foulds advised her of her options under Texas law—being arrested or signing her name (without additional annotation) on a written notice to appear in court—and told her that she could present her objections regarding his handling of the matter when she appeared in court. Such allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983. That Foulds might have been more tactful, patient, or considerate in his interactions with Soward is beside the point.
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/unpub/26/26-20037.0.pdf