Facts
In June 2022, Officer Dan Russell of the Hernando Police Department (HPD) observed a Ford Explorer on Interstate 55 that displayed a temporary tag. Russell followed behind the vehicle for more than a minute, and the driver was not speeding or committing any other traffic violations. Nonetheless, Russell initiated a traffic stop. Jamie Saulsberry was driving the vehicle, her boyfriend, Terrance Wilson, was in the front passenger seat, and her brother was in the backseat.
As Russell approached the passenger side of the vehicle, he detected an odor of marijuana. He requested Saulsberry’s license and proof of insurance, and Wilson also provided his identification along with the vehicle’s title. Russell then instructed all three occupants to exit the vehicle. An initial search of the vehicle revealed a misdemeanor amount of marijuana in the glove compartment, and a subsequent search uncovered a nine-millimeter handgun lodged between the front passenger seat and the center console. After acknowledging his Miranda rights, Wilson admitted that the marijuana belonged to him, but he denied ownership or possession of the gun. Based on the location of the handgun and inculpatory statements Wilson made to police, Wilson was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon.
Prior to trial, Wilson moved to suppress all evidence obtained during the traffic stop, arguing that Russell lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop. At the suppression hearing, Russell testified that he could see the temporary tag before initiating the stop. Russell acknowledged that the tag was not “obscured or . . . difficult to read or dirty or anything like that.” Nonetheless, Russell stated that the tag “wasn’t a verifiable tag.” Russell acknowledged that he did not actually attempt to verify the tag while following the vehicle. He stated that based on his training and experience, he knew that temporary tags are not verifiable through HPD’s database. Russell testified that, in his view, he had probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop any vehicle that displayed a drive out or temporary tag. In addition, Russell stated that he wanted to verify that the vehicle wasn’t stolen and that the occupants, whether they were Mississippi or Tennessee residents, . . . were compliant with the state law as far as the tag goes. Wilson believed the law allowed a car buyer seven to ten business days to have a tag on the vehicle and have it registered.* Following the suppression hearing, the trial court denied Wilson’s motion to suppress, and the case proceeded to trial.
The jury found Wilson guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years in custody without eligibility for parole. MCOA reversed.
* Mississippi law provides that a temporary tag issued by a Mississippi motor vehicle dealer is valid for seven working days; “however, if the temporary tag . . . is issued to a nonresident of the State of Mississippi, the temporary tag or plate shall be valid for the number of days within which the nonresident is required to obtain a permanent motor vehicle license tag or plate by the laws of the nonresident’s state of residence. Miss. Code Ann. § 27-19-40(2) (Rev. 2022). On the date of the traffic stop in this case (June 19, 2022), Tennessee law provided that dealer drive-out tags were valid for thirty days, which was extended to sixty days effective July 1, 2022. See Tennessee Department of Revenue, Dealer Drive-Out Tags, https://www.tn.gov/revenue/title-and-registration/ez-dealer-tags.html (last visited February 13, 2026).
Analysis
Wilson argues that the evidence obtained during the traffic stop should have been suppressed because he was illegally seized and detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 3, Section 23 of the Mississippi Constitution.
The State argues that this Court’s decision in Wilson demonstrates that there was reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop here. In Stanley Wilson, a police officer initiated a traffic stop based upon the lack of a visible license tag displayed on the vehicle, as well as the driver’s suspicious behavior, including stopping at a green light and remaining stopped for ten to fifteen seconds. Contrary to the officer’s testimony, photographs admitted into evidence showed a clearly displayed temporary or paper drive-out license tag from a dealership visible on the back windshield of the vehicle. However, the officer maintained throughout the hearing that the tag was not visible to him when he stopped the vehicle, possibly because of the glare of the bright noonday sun. The trial judge found the officer’s testimony credible and found that he had reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop to investigate the apparent lack of a tag. This Court affirmed on appeal, noting that Mississippi statutes require car tags, including temporary tags, to be properly and conspicuously displayed.
Stanley Wilson is readily distinguishable from the current case. Here, Officer Russell testified that he was able to see and read the temporary tag and that the tag was not obscured in any way. Quite unlike the officer in Stanley Wilson, Russell maintained that the presence of a visible temporary tag provided reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. Also, unlike the officer in Stanley Wilson, Russell did not claim that the stop was based in whole or in part on any “suspicious behavior” by the driver. To the contrary, Russell acknowledged that he followed the vehicle for a distance and did not observe the driver commit any traffic violations or engage in any other suspicious behavior.
A paper or temporary tag must be conspicuously displayed in such a manner that it may be easily read. See MSC Gonzales. However, the record here establishes that the subject vehicle’s temporary tag was clearly displayed, and there is no evidence that the tag in any way failed to comply with the law. Russell initiated the stop solely because the vehicle had a temporary tag—after he had followed the vehicle for a distance but observed no traffic violations.
Based on our own research, it appears that a number of other courts have expressly held that the mere presence of a temporary tag does not give rise to “reasonable suspicion” or authorize an officer to initiate a traffic stop. In State v. Butler, 539 S.E.2d 414, 416 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000), the South Carolina Court of Appeals held “that the mere presence of a temporary tag on the back of a car, without more, is insufficient to provide a reasonable suspicion that the driver is violating registration or insurance laws or that the driver is otherwise involved in criminal activity.” In Berry v. State, 547 S.E.2d 664, 668-69 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001), the Georgia Court of Appeals likewise held that the presence of a temporary tag does not establish reasonable suspicion or justify a stop. The court rejected the officer’s suspicion that a vehicle with a temporary tag might be stolen as a “mere inclination or hunch” unsupported by any specific and articulable facts.
In People v. Hernandez, 196 P.3d 806, 807 (Cal. 2008), the California Supreme Court held that an officer may not stop a vehicle displaying a temporary tag “simply because he or she believes that such permits are often forged or otherwise invalid.” Rather, to support a stop the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the particular permit is invalid. Otherwise, any car with such a permit could be stopped without particularized cause.
Likewise, in State v. Lord, 723 N.W.2d 425 (Wis. 2006), the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that an officer may not initiate a traffic stop based solely on the display of a temporary license plate. In State v. Childs, 495 N.W.2d 475, 481-82 (Neb. 1993), the Nebraska Supreme Court also held that a traffic stop based solely on the presence of a temporary tag violates the Fourth Amendment. And in Clinton v. Garrett, 49 F.4th 1132, 1141 (8th Cir. 2022), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed that it is a constitutional violation to stop a vehicle merely because it has a temporary tag without a particularized basis for suspecting the tag is in violation of state law. Finally, in United States v. Wiley Wilson, 205 F.3d 720, 723 24 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the mere presence of a temporary tag does not justify the initiation of a traffic stop when the tag is properly displayed and is not obliterated, smudged, faded, or concealed. The court put the point succinctly: “The Fourth Amendment does not allow a policeman to stop a car just because it has temporary tags.” In contrast, we have identified no decisions holding that it is constitutionally permissible to initiate a traffic stop based solely on the presence of a temporary tag.
Consistent with the reasoning of other state and federal courts, we cannot accept the State’s argument that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 23 of the Mississippi Constitution permit an officer to initiate a traffic stop solely because a vehicle has a temporary tag. Rather, consistent with the United States Constitution and the Mississippi Constitution, a vehicle displaying a temporary tag is not subject to a traffic stop unless the tag is not properly displayed or some other articulable facts give rise to a particularized and reasonable suspicion that the temporary tag is invalid or that the vehicle or an occupant have violated some other law.
Because Russell admittedly initiated the subject traffic stop solely because the vehicle had a temporary tag, the circuit court erred by denying Wilson’s motion to suppress. And because all evidence against Wilson was obtained as a result of that illegal stop, and there is no remaining evidence to uphold Wilson’s conviction,” we reverse.