Facts
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In September of 2018, Michael Holmes attended a public fair located at Our Lady of Perpetual Help School in Belle Chasse, Louisiana. Holmes, a member of a camera club in Metairie, wanted to test out a new camera lens he had recently gotten. He arrived at the fair at approximately 4:00 p.m. in the afternoon. After his arrival, he and a friend, Amos Jay Cormier, III, engaged in a pleasant conversation about local politics. Cormier testified that Holmes was his normal cordial polite self during that conversation— a very civilized man, a civilized gentleman. Cormier testified that, to the best of his knowledge, Holmes had not been drinking.
At some point between 4:00 and 4:30 p.m., Holmes saw another friend of his, James Olsen, and struck up a conversation about photography. Similar to Cormier’s testimony, Olsen explained that Holmes was his usual self and sober. Holmes then began testing his new camera lens by taking pictures of an amusement ride that had a colorful mural on it. He climbed up one of the slides to gain a suitable vantage point and took all of the pictures he would take that day at the fair between 5:12 p.m. and 5:14 p.m. Holmes then visited the various fair booths, during which time he observed a girl he wanted to invite on future photography club field trips. He testified that he had already announced to the club that he planned to take his niece’s children and other children on an upcoming club trip to take photographs at an amusement park.
He approached a woman whom he believed to be the girl’s mother, introduced himself by name, and they exchanged contact information. He did not take a picture of the child. Some time later, Holmes was standing approximately 35 to 40 feet from the sheriff’s dunking booth, watching people throw baseballs at the dunk booth target. As he was watching, someone tapped him on the shoulder. He turned around and saw it was a Plaquemines Parish deputy sheriff—later determined to be Corbett Reddoch—who asked for Holmes’s identification. Holmes very calmly asked Reddoch why, to which Reddoch only responded “follow me.” Holmes began to comply with the officer’s instruction, but then stopped after following Reddoch for a few paces.
Reddoch noticed that Holmes had stopped, turned to approach Holmes, and again asked for Holmes’s identification. Holmes asked a second time for an explanation, then got the impression that something was up, and so he put his hands down by his side with his palms open so Reddoch would see that he was no threat. Reddoch then stepped up close to Holmes’s left side, grabbed his wrist, and, as Holmes testified: Reddoch had me by my left wrist forcefully and he had his other arm across my shoulder blade and the back of my upper arm, my humerus against his tricep muscle, and he stepped in front of me. He was on my left. He had ahold of me like this. He put his arm against my shoulder blade, pulled my left arm up and stepped in front of me and tripped me and threw me to the ground.
Once Holmes was face down on the ground, Reddoch kneeled on Holmes’s back with all his weight. After other deputies arrived and assisted in handcuffing Holmes, Reddoch escorted Holmes back to the entrance of the fair. Holmes continued to ask Reddoch why he had been arrested, to which Reddoch replied: “You were taking pictures of children.” Holmes was only charged with resisting arrest. Holmes testified that, following his arrest, Reddoch told him: We’re going to throw you in prison and I’m going to tell—make sure all the other prisoners know why you’re in.
Holmes filed suit in federal district court and this case proceeded to trial. The jury found that (1) Reddoch unreasonably stopped Holmes, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, but that he was entitled to qualified immunity; (2) Reddoch unreasonably arrested Holmes, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that qualified immunity did not shield him from liability; (3) Holmes failed to prove his Fourth Amendment excessive force claim by a preponderance of the evidence; and (4) Holmes failed to prove his First Amendment retaliation claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Reddoch appealed the unreasonable arrest verdict. The 5th affirmed.
Analysis
As a baseline, the constitutional claim of false arrest requires a showing of no probable cause. On appeal, Reddoch asserts that the evidence shows that he had probable cause to arrest Holmes for: (1) resisting arrest, in violation of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:108; and (2) disturbing the peace, in violation of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:103.6.
A. Resisting arrest
Louisiana’s resisting arrest statute states, in pertinent part: Resisting an officer is the intentional interference with, opposition or resistance to, or obstruction of an individual acting in his official capacity and authorized by law to make a lawful arrest, lawful detention, or seizure of property or to serve any lawful process or court order when the offender knows or has reason to know that the person arresting, detaining, seizing property, or serving process is acting in his official capacity.
The phrase “obstruction of” as used herein shall, in addition to its common meaning, signification, and connotation mean the following: Refusal by the arrested or detained party to give his name and make his identity known to the arresting or detaining officer or providing false information regarding the identity of such party to the officer. La. Stat. Ann. § 14:108(A)–(B)(1), B(1)(c).
It is undisputed that Reddoch approached Holmes at the fair. Reddoch testified that he asked if he could speak with him, to which Holmes responded with an aggressive and expletive-laden refusal. In contrast, Holmes testified that Reddoch had walked up to him and immediately demanded to see his identification, to which Holmes asked: “Why?” On cross-examination, Reddoch testified that Holmes’s angry outburst could be heard from approximately 50 feet away. But despite the fact that, according to Reddoch, the purportedly expletive-inflected response from Holmes was made in front of a group of children, and approximately fifty feet away from another officer in the vicinity, no one testified that they heard that alleged exchange. And, Reddoch admitted that he never included Holmes’s angry outburst in any incident report.
The jury was thus entitled to conclude that Reddoch’s testimony was not credible and to accept Holmes’s version of events. Under the applicable standard of review, the jury’s decision as to which version to believe is entitled to significant deference. Accepting, then, that Reddoch walked up to Holmes and immediately demanded his identification, to which Holmes replied, “Why?,” Reddoch’s assertion that he had probable cause to arrest Holmes for violation of § 14:108 fails. This is because, according to his testimony, Holmes never refused to identify himself—he merely wanted to know why an officer was making that demand.
According to SCOTUS, the Fourth Amendment is not offended when a state statute only requires a detainee to state his or her name. See SCOTUS Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177 (2004). The statute does not require a suspect to give the officer a driver’s license or any other document. Provided that the suspect either states his name or communicates it to the officer by other means . . . the statute is satisfied and no Fourth Amendment violation occurs. And this court has recognized the principle that the police cannot arrest an individual solely for refusing to provide identification. See Turner. Unsurprisingly, § 14:108B(1)(b) (c) conforms to these precedents, as it only criminalizes the refusal to provide a name after being lawfully detained or arrested.
According to the jury, relying on Holmes’s testimony, Holmes did not refuse to provide his name prior to his arrest. He only asked for an explanation in response to a request that, according to our precedents, he need not have heeded. The jury and the district court reasonably rejected Reddoch’s contention that §14:108(B) provided him with probable cause to arrest Holmes.
B. Disturbance of peace
Reddoch’s second justification—Holmes’s purported disturbance of the peace, in violation of La. Stat. Ann. § 14:103—fails for the same reason. Louisiana’s disturbance-of-the-peace statute provides, in pertinent part:
Disturbing the peace is the doing of any of the following in such manner as would foreseeably disturb or alarm the public: Addressing any offensive, derisive, or annoying words to any other person who is lawfully in any street, or other public place; or call him by an offensive or derisive name, or make any noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing with the intent to deride, offend, or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful business, occupation, or duty § 14:103(A)(2).
When we accept Holmes’s version of events, as the jury reasonably did, Holmes’s behavior did not provide Reddoch with probable cause to arrest him under this statute. That is because, according to Holmes, Reddoch approached him and immediately demanded that he produce his identification, prompting Holmes to calmly ask why Reddoch was making that request. The jury rejected Reddoch’s contention that Holmes launched an angry tirade at Reddoch—a credibility determination that was accepted by the district court in its decision to reject Reddoch’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and that we must also accept on appeal.
In sum, Reddoch’s contention that the evidence elucidated at trial shows that he had probable cause to arrest Holmes fails. The district court thus did not err.
Comment
As you can see from above, Louisiana has a statute which criminalizes refusal/falsification of providing name while on a Terry stop: refusal by the arrested or detained party to give his name and make his identity known to the arresting or detaining officer or providing false information regarding the identity of such party to the officer.
Mississippi does not have a similar statute.
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/23/23-30424-CV0.pdf