Facts
On June 25, 2020, law enforcement from the Prentiss County Sheriff’s Department responded to a 911 call. A woman had emerged from the woods near the caller’s residence in distress, covered with bruises, cuts, and scratch marks. When law enforcement arrived at the residence, the woman said Jesse Lee Robinson had assaulted her. The officers knew that Robinson worked with his father, Bryan, at a nearby vehicle repair shop that his father owned.
Robinson worked from a metal desk in the shop where he kept his vehicle dealer paperwork. The desk was situated in the open between two bay doors; it was not in an office. Bryan testified that Robinson did not own the desk but basically leased the desk. Bryan never used the desk or stored items in it. Bryan also testified the injured woman was Robinson’s girlfriend who had been living with him and Robinson.
Several officers drove to the shop to speak with Robinson about the alleged assault. Bryan had just arrived in the parking lot and was met by the officers. Robinson was already inside the shop. Bryan testified that only he and his son worked at the shop—Bryan worked on vehicles, and Robinson sold vehicles.
The officers asked Bryan if they could talk to Robinson, and Bryan agreed, letting the officers inside the shop while he stayed outside. Deputy Aaron Stolz testified that when he and Investigator Torie Jumper entered, Robinson said, “Don’t come in, don’t come in!” Both officers testified that Robinson then ran towards his desk, and with one arm, strewed a powder-like substance across the top of the desk. Deputy Stolz grabbed Robinson and patted him down for weapons. Robinson, who was agitated, refused to cooperate, and exclaimed, “I didn’t do nothing,” referring to his girlfriend, and said she was “crazy.” Then, Robinson admitted that he and his girlfriend had had an altercation. Deputy Stolz placed Robinson in handcuffs, charging him with misdemeanor “family disturbance.”
During the arrest, officers saw on the desk what they described as a “powder-like” or “crystal-like” substance that Robinson had strewn across it, which they suspected was methamphetamine. They also saw on the desk, in plain view, duct tape and several glass pipes, as well as a rifle propped behind the desk and against the wall. The officers then exited the building, taking Robinson outside where his father was. Nobody else was inside the building.
Wanting to investigate the premises further for drugs, Investigator Jumper contacted a justice court judge about obtaining a search warrant. The judge advised her to obtain consent from Bryan to search the shop instead of a warrant. Bryan agreed to the search and signed a “Permission to Search Form,” allowing the officers to search the shop. After obtaining consent, Deputy Stolz, Investigator Jumper, and another officer reentered the shop and conducted their search. They began searching around the desk area, collecting the “crystal-like substance” off the top of the desk. Deputy Stolz also found a clear container with a magnet attached to the desk’s bottom corner. A powdery residue was inside it. Drug paraphernalia was also collected from the top of the desk—several glass “meth pipes” (one clean and several used), the clear magnetic container, an earbud case holding several probable marijuana joints, Ziploc bags, zip ties, two sets of scales, and a vacuum-sealing machine.
There was also a busted cell phone lying on the desk. Investigator Jumper testified that she picked it up, felt it, and took off the phone’s case. She testified that inside, between the case and the phone, was a $100 bill and a piece of aluminum foil neatly folded up. Investigator Jumper carefully opened it to find a sheet of “little squares,” which was thought to be a blotter sheet of LSD.
Robinson was transported to the Prentiss County jail for the family disturbance charge, with a “hold” placed on him for the possible drug charges. When Investigator Jumper returned to the station, she gave the alleged methamphetamine and LSD blotter sheet to Officer Joey Clark, a narcotics officer, who took over the investigation. He performed a field test on one of the sheet’s fourteen square stamps, which tested positive for LSD. Officer Clark then turned the drugs over to the local crime lab for further testing. Those tests confirmed the square stamps were fourteen dosage units of LSD, a Schedule I drug, and the crystal-like substance was .18 grams of methamphetamine, a Schedule II drug.
Before trial and against the advice of defense counsel, Robinson, pro se, made a motion to suppress the drugs found at Bryan’s shop. Robinson contended that the officers never asked for consent to enter the shop initially. He also claimed that Investigator Jumper told him because the officers did not have a search warrant to enter the building, the evidence obtained was inadmissible. In response, the State presented the testimony of Investigator Jumper and Bryan, detailed above. Robinson concluded his argument by stating the evidence was not seized incident to his arrest for misdemeanor family disturbance but was seized after his arrest and departure from the building; so any consent that was given for the officers to reenter and search the building needed to be in relation to the domestic crime and not the possible narcotics crime. The trial judge denied Robinson’s motion, finding the officers had obtained proper consent from Bryan to enter the building initially, and Investigator Jumper properly obtained consent to reenter the building through the consent-to-search form after seeing the drugs in plain view on the desk. No mention was made by either party or the trial court specifically about the search of the cell phone case and the LSD seized.
Jesse Lee Robinson was found guilty of possession of methamphetamine (Count I) and possession of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) (Count II) by a Prentiss County jury. The trial court sentenced him to serve three years for Count I and eight years for Count II, set to run consecutively in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Robinson appeals, arguing the search and seizure of the drugs was illegal. MCOA affirmed.
Analysis
Robinson argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the drugs found during the search of his desk and cell phone case. He contends that the warrantless search of his desk and cell phone was improper because there was no applicable exception to the warrant requirement. Specifically, he claims there was no valid consent to search the desk; the plain-view doctrine does not apply; the search was not incident to a valid arrest; and there were no exigent circumstances. Robinson argues that the cell phone was a closed container, and while in plain view, there was nothing inherently incriminating to justify dismantling the cell phone. Thus, he claims his convictions should be reversed and rendered.
We find the search of the desk was valid because Bryan gave valid consent to search the shop and its property. Because a valid consent resolves Robinson’s other issues, we will not discuss them. Regarding the search of the cell phone, Robinson’s motion to suppress evidence never mentioned it specifically, nor did Robinson mention it during the hearing. Further, the trial court based its ruling on the propriety of the consent-to-search form and the seizure of the drugs in plain view on the desk. Now, on appeal, Robinson’s counsel argues that the cell phone was a closed container that was improperly dismantled to find the LSD. It is well settled that issues not brought before the trial court are deemed waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Because Robinson did not raise the issue of the search of the cell phone before the trial court, the issue is waived.
Robinson argues that Bryan’s consent to search the shop by signing the permission form was invalid. Robinson contends that because Bryan testified that Robinson leased the desk, the issue is whether the landlord, Bryan, had authority to consent to search the tenant Robinson’s area and property, which would include the desk. Robinson concludes that Bryan did not have such authority. We disagree.
A voluntary consent to a search eliminates an officer’s need to obtain a search warrant. The prosecution is not limited to proof that consent was given by the defendant, but may show that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.
Here, Bryan first gave oral consent to Deputy Stolz and Investigator Jumper to go into the shop and speak with Robinson. Once inside the shop, the officers saw Robinson run towards the desk and strew a powder-like substance, in plain-view, across the top of it. They also saw on the desk, in plain view, drug paraphernalia and a rifle. Officers then arrested Robinson and took him outside because he was noticeably agitated and refusing to cooperate.
The second consent Bryan gave, at issue here, occurred when the officers wanted to reenter the shop to take a second look inside based upon what they had seen in plain view while arresting Robinson. Investigator Jumper called a justice court judge about obtaining a search warrant, but the judge advised her to have Bryan, as owner of the shop, sign a “Permission to Search” form, which he did. The form allowed the officers “to conduct a search of the premises and property, including all buildings and vehicles both inside and outside of the property” without a search warrant. Additionally, the form gave the officers permission to seize “any letters, papers, materials or any other property or things which they desire as evidence for criminal prosecution in the case . . . under investigation.” The officers then reentered the shop and searched around the desk area. They seized the powder-like substance from the top of the desk, the clear container with powder residue attached to the desk by a magnet, glass pipes, and other various drug paraphernalia. The trial court based its denial of Robinson’s motion to suppress on finding the officers obtained proper consent both to enter the shop initially and later to reenter the building to search because the drugs were in plain view on the desk.
Robinson now claims the consent form did not apply to the desk. Robinson bases his argument on an alleged landlord-tenant relationship between him and Bryan regarding the search of the desk. Robinson maintains that he was a tenant leasing the desk from Bryan; thus, he would be considered an “owner” of the desk and had control of the desk during the time of the search. As owner of the desk at the time, because he did not consent, the search of the desk was illegal in his view. Robinson also contends that since the desk was not shared, but one he used exclusively, there was no co-tenancy arrangement, and Bryan could not give consent to search the desk.
Bryan’s consent to search the premises, including the desk, was voluntary and valid. Bryan was the undisputable owner of the shop and the land upon which it was situated. There was conflicting testimony about whether Bryan or Robinson owned the desk—Bryan testified that Robinson did not own the desk but leased it, while Investigator Jumper testified that she believed Robinson owned the desk. Regardless, there was no evidence presented of a lease agreement for the desk between Bryan and Robinson, only Bryan’s vague testimony that Robinson “basically leased” the desk. Further, the form that Bryan signed gave officers consent to search the shop and all personal property within it.
The cases Robinson cites, Chapman and Scott, are distinguishable because they deal with rented premises, not rented personal property, as alleged here. Bryan’s written permission to search the building would have included the desk. Further, the powdery substance on the desk was in plain view along with drug paraphernalia. There is no evidence that the officers searched inside the desk’s drawers. Bryan had the authority to consent to the search of the desk, and the officers did not exceed that scope.