Facts
At approximately 8:02 p.m. on July 26, 2021, Deputy Elward was dispatched to 132 Foote Drive, Braxton, Mississippi, in response to a complaint that a male suspect had broken into and vandalized a residence; it was unknown if items were missing. The dispatch report noted that the suspect had run into nearby woods and “was acting high and paranoid.” Deputy Elward radioed to dispatch that the suspect had “tore up” some things and may have possibly taken a “shotgun.”
Deputy Elward was informed that the suspect was a nearby resident, Damien Cameron, who was also called “Toot.” Monica Lee, Damien’s mother, who had been alerted about Damien’s behavior, arrived at the vandalized residence. Lee talked with Deputy Elward and allowed him to follow her home to 147 Foote Drive, where Damien lived with Lee and her parents. Lee warned the deputy that Damien was “paranoid” and would probably run from him.
Damien was not at home when they arrived; so Deputy Elward went outside to his truck. It was then that the deputy observed someone emerging from the nearby woods. According to Elward, the subject fit the description given to me, his mother confirmed his identity by pointing at him and yelling that’s him, that’s Toot. When the deputy yelled his name, Damien took off running behind the house. Deputy Elward pursued Damien, repeatedly instructing him to turn around and put his hands behind his back and warning Damien he would be tased if he did not comply. However, Damien kept running toward the back door; so Deputy Elward deployed his taser striking the suspect in the center of his back. Damien fell down onto the steps. When the deputy attempted to handcuff him, Damien got back up and ran into the house; so Deputy Elward tased him a second time with little or no effect. Damien pulled the taser prongs out and ran through the house toward a bedroom. Meanwhile, Damien’s grandfather, James Cameron (Cameron), was pleading with Damien to comply with the deputy’s instructions.
Damien and Deputy Elward “tussled” in the house during the deputy’s attempt to subdue and handcuff Damien. Deputy Elward admitted to striking Damien twice “at or near his left eye” with his closed fist, but the deputy claimed that Damien was trying to “punch” him. As the two men continued to tussle on the floor, Deputy Elward was able to get one handcuff on Damien while rolling him to a prone position. However, Damien had his other hand underneath his stomach, making it difficult for Deputy Elward to handcuff him.
Deputy Stickman arrived at this point to assist Deputy Elward. Lee and both of her parents asserted that Deputy Stickman got down and kneeled on the back of Damien’s neck to restrain him, although Lee acknowledged that she had not mentioned that fact in her initial statement to law enforcement. According to Betty Cameron, Damien’s grandmother: Elward had him down on the floor beside my bed and my dresser. His head was down in front of my dresser with his knee in Damien’s back. This other policeman came in . . . . He kneeled down on Toot. . . . That’s what I always call Damien. He kneeled down on the side of his head and his neck with his knee, and Damien kept saying he couldn’t breathe. Deputy Stickman, however, stated in his report that he was on the balls of my feet with my knees slightly on his back with not much pressure so he can’t roll over, stand up. Cameron testified that from the time Deputy Stickman arrived until they got Damien in handcuffs was “longer than a minute.”
According to the statements given by Lee and Cameron to agents with the Mississippi Bureau of Investigations (MBI), Damien began complaining at that point that he was unable to breathe. Lee also observed that Damien’s eye was bleeding and “swelling shut.” After handcuffing Damien, the deputies pulled him to his feet. Cameron stated, “They had to drag him up off – both of them picked him up off the floor because he kept telling them he couldn’t breathe.” Lee and her parents said that Damien “walked out” of the house with the deputies on either side of him, with Cameron initially stating that Damien was “kind of pushing back.” However, Cameron later clarified that Damien was walking “with the help of them on each side holding him up,” asserting: Sir, the way I see it, you just too weak to walk after the police had got off his neck and had him up. If he had, was walking back out of breath and half knocked out, he’s going to have to be holding back if they have to hold him up for him to walk. Damien couldn’t have walked out of there by himself without some help. While taking him to the patrol car, the deputies stated in their reports that Damien would occasionally drop to the ground; so they would have to pull him back up.
Elward’s report noted: We made it to my patrol unit and tried to get him in back seat, but he would go back and forth from resisting and kicking, to dropping himself to the ground, and we tried 6 or 7 times to pick him up into the back seat but from the rain and mud, and his strong resistance, he would wiggle his way back to the ground. At this point he just sat there for a minute so myself and Deputy Stickman might recover as well.
Betty also stated in her deposition that she saw Damien “fall to the ground.” In her statement to MBI, Lee claimed that Damien “told them he was tired” and could not breathe. Lee also said, “I asked them could I get my son some water. Deputy Elward said ‘No, he don’t want no water. He just don’t want to get in the f**king truck.’” Lee later stated during her deposition that Damien had asked her “for a drink of water.”
Deputy Stickman reported, “After a short time, Deputy Elward was able to pick the suspect up and place him halfway into the vehicle.” Deputy Stickman claimed that when Damien would not put his feet in the car, Deputy Elward used Deputy Stickman’s taser to “drive stun” Damien in the thigh to get him to comply. Lee was not an eyewitness to the officers’ placing Damien in the patrol car, but Cameron testified in his deposition, “When they went to put him in the car, they didn’t turn him around and sit him down. They shoved him up in there.” When asked if he could see Damien in the patrol car, Cameron replied, “No, when they put him in there, they throwed him in there. He was handcuffed, so he had to fall on his face on the seat . . . . He wasn’t sitting up because he was lying down on the seat or in the floorboard somewhere back there.”
Once Damien was in the back of the patrol car, the officers went inside to gather their equipment and talk to Damien’s mother. She also said Deputy Elward advised her to talk to the chancery clerk about getting Damien “some help.” When Deputy Elward came back out to the truck, he observed Damien “slumped over the seat” with no pulse. Deputy Elward performed CPR on Damien until emergency medical services arrived, but Damien was later pronounced deceased at the hospital. An autopsy by the state’s medical examiner found that Damien’s blood contained “methamphetamine and amphetamine” and that his body had suffered multiple subcutaneous and soft tissue hemorrhages. The cause and manner of death were “Undetermined.”
On May 14, 2024, the circuit court entered an order granting the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment for excessive force under 42 USC 1983. The court held that the plaintiffs could not show a constitutional violation, and if they could, the plaintiffs have not identified clearly established law. The circuit court also granted summary judgement to Rankin County under MTCA for the same claim. MCOA reversed.
Analysis
A. Whether Plaintiffs clearly established a constitutional violation
There is clearly established law that applying pressure or body-weight force to a prone suspect could constitute excessive force under certain circumstances; so we will proceed to address the second issue—whether the deputies’ actions were objectively reasonable in light of this clearly established law.
B. Whether the deputies’ conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at the time that the challenged conduct occurred
B1. The Severity of the Crime at Issue
Damien was highly intoxicated, had broken into and destroyed the inside of a neighbor’s house, possibly stolen a firearm from the neighbor’s house, and fought with Elward in his attempted flight from the officer. Sheriff Bailey further testified that once Damien failed to comply with Elward’s instructions, it would have been a disorderly conduct charge along with the felony malicious mischief he was investigating. We find that this factor favors a finding that the officers’ actions were objectively reasonable.
B2. Whether Damien posed an immediate threat to others
Elward claimed in his affidavit he was told that Damien may have stolen a “shotgun” during his vandalism of the neighbor’s home, and it was further reported that Damien was “high and paranoid.” Elward also claimed Damien tried to “punch” him while they were tussling, but there is no other testimony to support Elward’s claim.
However, Elward has since been convicted of falsifying incident reports, among other serious crimes, of which the circuit court would have been aware at the time the court issued its final order. We find that there exists a material fact in dispute as to whether Damien posed an immediate threat to Elward or others.
B3. Whether Damien was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight
The central questions of fact concern whether Damien was still actively resisting arrest or instead was struggling to breathe after being subdued by the deputies. The parties dispute whether Damien’s movements after being restrained constituted continued resistance or attempts to reposition himself so he could breathe. Family members consistently testified that Damien repeatedly stated, “I can’t breathe, and described him as weak and unable to walk, while the deputies characterized his conduct as resistance and attempts to evade arrest. There is also a factual dispute over the amount and type of force used, including whether Deputy Stickman placed his knee on Damien’s neck or merely applied limited pressure to his back, whether the officers’ actions amounted to a prohibited choke hold or excessive force, and whether Damien had already been subdued at the time additional force was used.
Additional disputed factual issues involve the cause of Damien’s death and whether the deputies’ continued use of force—particularly the third taser deployment after Damien was handcuffed and partially inside the patrol car—was objectively reasonable. The medical evidence conflicts, with the State Medical Examiner listing the cause of death as undetermined while Plaintiffs’ expert opined that Damien died from restraint-associated asphyxia caused by compression to his neck, back, and chest during restraint. The parties also dispute whether Damien was still resisting when the third taser use occurred, as the deputies claimed he was kicking and resisting while witnesses testified he had already been beaten, restrained, was struggling to breathe, and could barely stand. These factual disputes were found sufficient to preclude summary judgment because a jury must determine whether the force used was excessive under the circumstances.
C. Whether the circuit court erred in finding Rankin County was entitled to immunity under the MTCA
Under the MTCA, a governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties shall not be liable for any claim that arises out of any act or omission of an employee of a governmental entity engaged in the performance or execution of duties or activities relating to police or fire protection unless the employee acted in reckless disregard of the safety and well being of any person not engaged in criminal activity at the time of injury. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(c).
Thus, this statutory provision affords a governmental entity two avenues of immunity: (1) if the decedent was engaged in criminal activity, then the governmental entity is immune, and (2) if the decedent was not engaged in criminal activity, and if the governmental entity’s employees did not act with reckless disregard, then the governmental entity is immune.”
C1. Criminal Activity
The circuit court found that, after vandalizing a neighbor’s home, which Sheriff Bailey had characterized as “felony malicious mischief,” Damien (1) fled from the authorities, (2) failed to comply with a deputy’s repeated instructions and warnings, (3) and resisted arrest. As Lee and her father acknowledged, Damien “tussled” with Elward and refused to be handcuffed. We find there is credible evidence showing that there was the requisite “causal nexus” between the force used and Damien’s criminal activity prior to his restraint.
However, it would be a question of fact as to whether Damien’s continued resistance was actually resistance or movement to try to position himself to be able to breathe and is only one factor to be considered in determining the constitutionality of the actions of Elward and Stickman. Thus, there exists a disputed material fact as to when Damien’s active resistance ceased.
C2. Reckless Disregard
We find there are genuine issues of material fact whether the deputies’ use of force was “objectively reasonable” under the circumstances and whether Damien was actively resisting arrest after being handcuffed. Elward and Stickman reported that Damien repeatedly dropped to the ground (e.g., “the suspect continued to pull away and followed by dropping to the ground”), but they characterized his actions as resisting arrest. Damien’s family members averred that Damien was having trouble breathing and that the officers supported Damien’s walking to the patrol car and threw him face down into the vehicle.
Furthermore, there was conflicting evidence whether the officers knelt on Damien’s back and neck in their attempt to handcuff him. According to Sheriff Bailey, the county’s policies and procedures expressly prohibit the use of choke holds, which includes applying pressure to a person’s neck to stop the flow of blood to the brain. We find that it is evident how this violation of policy could create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the use of a choke hold in this instance, considering the totality of the circumstances (e.g., Damien’s clearly being under the influence of drugs, his stating he could not breathe, and subsequent expert testimony that “the cause of death is cardiopulmonary arrest as a result of neck and back/chest compression, by both officers”), constituted reckless disregard for Damien’s safety.
Conclusion
We reverse and remand the circuit court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Elward and Stickman, as we find there are genuine issues of material fact whether the deputies’ actions were objectively reasonable and entitled them to qualified immunity. We also reverse and remand the circuit court’s ruling to grant summary judgment in favor of Rankin County on the state law claim under the MTCA.