Facts
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On March 20, 2022, Marc Degenhardt, age 18, was driving his parents’ black Dodge Challenger. His brother Augustus, age 20, rode as a passenger. The Challenger was stopped at a traffic light waiting to turn left onto a highway; a blue Dodge Charger was also waiting to turn left in the next lane. The Degenhardts allege that when the light turned green, both vehicles turned left and merged into a single lane. Corpus Christi Police Lieutenant Phillip Bintliff observed the cars and pulled the Challenger over. Although the Degenhardts protested that they did nothing wrong, Bintliff, incensed, allegedly accused Marc of burning out at the intersection and peeling out from the intersection to race the other vehicle that was stopped at the light right in front of Bintliff’s patrol car. Bintliff explained that he had heard engine revving sounds and that he had seen the Challenger spin its tires.
Officer Armando Cisneros arrived at the scene shortly thereafter to assist. The Degenhardts allege that during the stop, Bintliff shined a flashlight into the vehicle and observed an opened cardboard box containing White Claw Hard Seltzers. After learning that the brothers were under 21, the officers ordered the Degenhardts out of the car. Cisneros then conducted a Terry frisk of Marc, discovering a vape pen. Throughout the stop, Bintliff and Cisneros repeatedly expressed frustration with what they perceived as the brothers’ defiant attitudes, noting that the Degenhardts were smirking and laughing throughout the encounter. The complaint alleges that the officers repeatedly threatened to arrest the Degenhardts if they failed to cooperate.
Next, the Degenhardts allege that Cisneros shouted at Bintliff that the officers should “take” the car in retaliation for the perceived disrespect of the officers. According to the complaint, Cisneros told Bintliff that they should impound the vehicle because the Degenhardts were laughing and smirking throughout the encounter. The officers then impounded the vehicle, charged both Marc and Augustus with possessing alcohol as minors, and issued Marc a warning for reckless driving. The officers did not arrest the Degenhardts; rather, they dropped them off at a nearby convenience store. The charges were later dropped.
The Degenhardts sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting four claims. The Degenhardts allege that (1) Bintliff unlawfully initiated the traffic stop and that both officers (2) unlawfully searched the car, (3) unlawfully seized the car, and (4) retaliated against the brothers for engaging in protected free speech. Bintliff and Cisneros moved to dismiss, arguing that the Degenhardts had not stated actionable claims and could not overcome qualified immunity. The district court dismissed the suit. The 5th reverses and denies Qualified Immunity as to the traffic stop but affirms (grants Qualified Immunity) on all other matters.
Analysis
A. Traffic Stop (Qualified Immunity denied)
The facts alleged in the Degenhardts’ complaint contradict Bintliff’s basis for initiating the traffic stop, namely, his suspicion that the driver of the Challenger (Marc Degenhardt) was unlawfully racing the driver of the Charger and driving recklessly. While Bintliff apparently observed the Challenger peeling out from the intersection to race the other vehicle, the Degenhardts allege that when the light turned green, both vehicles turned left and proceeded to travel down TX-361, before smoothly merging into one lane. Neither vehicle drove erratically, impeded other traffic, or otherwise offered a threat to anyone or anything in their surroundings. Neither vehicle moved to outpace the other, maintaining the same steady pace. Two cars smoothly shared the road.
At the motion-to-dismiss stage, we are required to accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Doing so requires us to credit the Degenhardts’ account of the cars’ smooth departure from the traffic light over Bintliff’s contention that the Challenger peeled out ahead of the Charger. Thus, assuming the truth of the complaint’s allegations, Bintliff lacked reasonable suspicion, and the Degenhardts have stated a claim for a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights as a result of the traffic stop. We therefore reverse the district court’s grant of the officers’ motion to dismiss on this point and remand for further proceedings.
B. Search of car (Quality Immunity granted)
It is well settled that warrantless searches of automobiles are permitted by the Fourth Amendment if the officers have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or other evidence of a crime. See McSween. As the complaint itself explains, the alcoholic beverages were in plain view of the officers before they opened the door of the vehicle. See Phillips (holding that marijuana lying in plain view on dashboard provided probable cause for warrantless search of vehicle). During the stop, Cisneros looked around at the visible areas of the Degenhardts’ car from his position next to the door with his flashlight. During his perusal, he noticed an opened cardboard box with cans in it, on the floorboard of the back seat behind Augustus’s seat. The cans were of White Claw Hard Seltzer. Thus, this observation provided reasonable suspicion of a crime, given the apparent youth of the Degenhardts. Upon confirming their ages, Defendants had probable cause to conduct a search of the vehicle. The district court properly dismissed the claim for an unreasonable search of the car.
C. Car Impounded (Quality Immunity granted)
Under the community caretaking exception, police may impound vehicles in furtherance of public safety or community caretaking functions such as removing disabled or damaged vehicles and automobiles that violate parking ordinances . . . jeopardizing both the public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic. See SCOTUS South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
The parties disagree about whether the community caretaker exception applied here. According to Bintliff and Cisneros, because the community caretaker exception allows officers to impound vehicles when the owner of the vehicle has been arrested while the vehicle is on the public streets, they could impound the vehicle because the officers had probable cause to effectuate a full custodial arrest of the Degenhardts for being minors in possession of alcohol. The Degenhardts, in contrast, argue that because they were not actually arrested and posed no threat to public safety—pleading that they were properly licensed to drive, sufficiently insured, unimpaired, and the car was not inoperable or otherwise a danger to the public—Bintliff and Cisneros were unjustified in impounding the car.
We agree with the Degenhardts. Bintliff and Cisneros simply contend that because they had probable cause to arrest the Degenhardts for possessing alcohol underage, they were free to impound the vehicle without a warrant. But given that the officers did not actually arrest the Degenhardts, probable cause alone was not enough under the community caretaker exception. Because we conclude that Bintliff and Cisneros failed to articulate a lawful justification to seize the vehicle, the Degenhardts have at least stated a claim for a violation of their Fourth Amendment right on this point.
The question, then, is whether such right is sufficiently established to defeat qualified immunity. We conclude that the answer is “no.” The Degenhardts fail to show that it is clearly established that impounding a vehicle when the available drivers were cited for a crime for which they could be arrested but were not amounted to an unconstitutional seizure. The Degenhardts cite only to caselaw standing for the proposition that an unreasonable seizure is generally unlawful. Such precedent is too general for purposes of qualified immunity. Bintliff and Cisneros are therefore entitled to qualified immunity with respect to this claim.
D. First Amendment (Qualified Immunity granted)
The Degenhardts allege that Bintliff and Cisneros seized them and their vehicle and initiated charges against them in retaliation for exercising their First Amendment rights, namely, smirking and laughing during the encounter. In the context of retaliatory arrest or prosecution, a plaintiff generally must show that the officers lacked probable cause to make the arrest. See SCOTUS Gonzalez v. Trevino, 144 S. Ct. 1663 (2024).
Bintliff and Cisneros established a lawful basis to search the car and to cite the Degenhardts for possessing alcohol as minors and driving recklessly. Additionally, the Degenhardts have not pleaded examples of similarly situated comparators who were treated differently. Thus, the Degenhardts have failed to plead facts sufficient to show that the officers’ actions were substantially motivated by the Degenhardts’ expressions.
That leaves the officers’ decision to impound the car. On this point, the Degenhardts have failed to overcome the officers’ qualified-immunity defense. The Degenhardts assert that the officers’ decision to impound the car was motivated by a desire to teach the Degenhardts a lesson for disrespecting police officers.
As discussed above, Bintliff and Cisneros have failed to articulate a lawful basis to seize the Challenger. The question, then, is whether the probable cause to arrest was nonetheless a non-retaliatory ground sufficient to provoke the officers’ decision to impound the vehicle. It was not, but Bintliff and Cisneros are entitled to a qualified-immunity defense because existing precedent had not placed the constitutional question beyond debate.
We had not clearly addressed whether probable cause to initiate an arrest (i.e., a seizure of a person) is a sufficient reason to seize property in that person’s possession. For the reasons set forth above, it is not. To defeat a retaliatory seizure claim, the officer must, at the very least, have had a lawful justification to seize the property. Nonetheless, Bintliff and Cisneros are entitled to qualified immunity.
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/24/24-40034-CV0.pdf