No reward attached to promise to inform the D.A. and the Judge of defendant’s cooperation

Facts

S. S. asserted that beginning when she was thirteen years old Raymond Joseph Greer had sexual intercourse with her. S.S. contended that, thereafter, she and Greer engaged in sexual intercourse on numerous occasions over an approximately three year period. Testimony established that Greer was approximately thirty at the time the sexual intercourse occurred between him and S. S.

S. S. and her mother went to the Hancock County Sheriff’s Department and informed investigators of the alleged crime. Thereafter, Greer was telephoned and instructed to come to the sheriff’s department. While at the sheriff’s department, Greer confessed to having sexual intercourse with S. S. While his recollection of the sexual encounters between him and S. S. were somewhat different than hers, as far as places and times, Greer stated that he and S. S. had had intercourse at least fifteen times.

Thereafter, Greer filed motions to suppress his confession. Each motion was denied by the trial judge. Subsequently, Greer was found guilty of capital rape and sentenced to serve a term of life imprisonment in the Mississippi Department of Corrections. MCOA affirmed.

Analysis

Greer argued that he had given the statement pursuant to promises from the investigator taking the statement. For the purposes of this appeal, Greer primarily focuses on his claim that he was offered promises in return for his confession.

Usually, a confession must be voluntary and not the result of promises, threats, or inducements to be deemed admissible.

Greer gave one recorded statement to an investigator with the Hancock County Sheriff’s Department in which he confessed to having sexual intercourse with S. S. on numerous occasions. Greer contends that there were approximately forty-four minutes prior to the tape that were unaccounted for and he asserts that during this time he was instructed by an investigator regarding what to say. Additionally, Greer argues that promises regarding leniency were made to him prior to the tape of his statement being made. Furthermore, Greer asserts that there are inconsistencies in his story and S. S.’s story which could only be explained by him forgetting what he had been told to say. We first note that any discrepancies in Greer’s and S. S.’s version of events regarding their sexual relations is not relevant to the issue of the suppression of his statement and is to be weighed by the jury.

MSC has been faced with a similar argument regarding the inducement of a confession by promises in Layne v. State, 542 So. 2d 237 (Miss. 1989). Layne argued that the trial court erred when it failed to grant his motion to suppress a written statement to a police officer, because it was given pursuant to promises of leniency from a police officer. In particular, a police officer had said that if Layne were to be cooperative with the investigation, the district attorney would be informed of this fact. MSC was troubled by the officer’s statement. Nevertheless, the MSC reviewed case law from other jurisdictions which had been faced with the same situation and held that if a statement such as one given to Layne regarding his cooperation were made without any other coercive psychological tactics it does not form an implied promise of leniency. MSC determined there was no evidence of further coercive psychological tactics, or that the promise to tell the district attorney was a proximate cause of Layne’s confession; therefore, the statement was voluntary and admissible.

The State presented testimony from the investigating officer who obtained the statement from Greer. The investigator explained that a portion of the forty-four minute delay was caused by the fact that it took him about twenty-five to thirty minutes to find a voluntary statement form. The testimony of the investigator and the transcript of the taped statement show that Greer was administered his Miranda rights prior to making the confession. In fact, Greer’s Miranda rights were reviewed in great detail by the investigator with Greer. Additionally, the record does not contain any evidence to substantiate the assertion that Greer was coached by an investigator with the sheriff’s department.

The following excerpt is a relevant portion of Greer’s taped statement taken by Investigator Strong regarding Greer’s assertion of a promise of leniency:

STRONG: Has anyone gave offered or promised you anything whatsoever to give, to make known the facts in this statement?
GREER: No sir
STRONG: What does that mean? Did anybody give you anything?
GREER: No
STRONG: Offer you anything?
GREER: No
STRONG: Did anybody tell you that you was going to get probation if you gave this statement?
GREER: No, no sir
STRONG: Did anybody tell you that you wasn’t going to go to the penitentiary?
GREER: No sir
STRONG: What did I tell you, that you was going go to the Penitentiary
GREER: That I was going, sure did
STRONG: That’s correct, has anybody promised you anything?
GREER: No sir
STRONG: Well that’s not true, I promised you that I’d talk to the district attorney and the judge and
tell him that you did indeed cooperate
GREER: Yea you did tell me that
STRONG: Okay, you giving this statement freely and voluntarily?
GREER: Yes sir.

Like Layne, Investigator Strong’s promise to inform the district attorney and the judge that Greer cooperated had no reward attached to it. Nor did Greer answer as if he believed he would be rewarded. Additionally, Kenneth Hurt, an employee with the Hancock County Sheriff’s Department was present during Greer’s statement. Hurt testified that Greer had not been threatened or promised leniency by him or Investigator Strong while in his presence. Furthermore, at the time of his statement, Greer did not appear to consider Investigator Strong’s promise to inform the district attorney and judge of his cooperation as a promise of leniency. Greer specifically denied having been made promises of leniency prior to the statement. Greer stated more than once during his confession that he was giving the statements voluntarily.

The trial judge noted the following in a portion of his ruling: But going directly to the motion to suppress, the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt and under the totality of the circumstances that the defendant did voluntarily and intelligently waive his privilege against self-incrimination. I base that upon the fact that the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is unworthy of belief.

The court noted during the course of the testimony as questioned by the attorneys and by the Court that on occasions concerning, particularly the cross of Mr. Bourgeois, concerning the cross-examination of the statement by the defendant that he had been promised probation, and that he had been promised that he wouldn’t get any time, and this business about whether he was cutting a deal and the business concerning 15 sex acts, the court observed a different inflection in his voice, the tone of his voice and observed the demeanor of his face as he responded to those questions.

But those factors, together with many other facts introduced during the first motion as well as this one, the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that he is unworthy of belief and finds that the statement was given freely and voluntarily and knowingly, and the court finds that any alleged promise or if it is a promise, I know that Mr. Strong called it a promise, but let me just be specific, that the statement that he would go to the DA and to the judge, I believe, whatever the record shows, was not any promise of leniency and it was not accompanied by any other coercive psychological tactics.

The facts presented and considered by the trial judge in his ruling were based on substantial credible evidence. The trial judge did not commit manifest error when he determined that the State had met its burden of proof and Greer’s taped statement was voluntary. Therefore, this issue is without merit.

https://courts.ms.gov/images/Opinions/Conv11604.pdf