Facts
On the morning of June 27, 2021, around 3:00 a.m., Officer Vaughn, who was parked in the highway median, noticed Dylan Chase Davis walking on Interstate 55 (I-55).
At the suppression hearing, Vaughn testified that during his patrol, he saw Davis walking northbound in the southbound lane of traffic on I-55. Vaughn stated that he noticed Davis walking in the lane of travel, but close to the white line. Vaughn also noticed that Davis was sweating profusely and was carrying what appeared to be a large knife in his pocket. Vaughn waited for Davis to get closer, and as Davis was walking past the patrol vehicle, Vaughn testified that he felt the need to check on Davis’s welfare, stating: I got out of my patrol vehicle. And as he was walking past my vehicle, I asked him where he was headed. He advised he was headed to Illinois, and he continued walking. I advised him to stop, come over in the median, and talk to me.
When Davis reached the median, Vaughn asked him if he (Vaughn) could remove the knife. Vaughn also asked Davis for his identification and noticed a bulge in the front of Davis’s pants. Vaughn asked Davis if the bulge was a firearm, and Davis said “yes.” According to Vaughn, Davis consented to Vaughn’s taking possession of the gun. After removing the firearm, Vaughn asked Davis if he was a convicted felon, to which Davis answered that he was not. When Vaughn checked for Davis’s criminal history, he learned that Davis had been convicted of a felony (attempted burglary of a habitation with intent to commit theft in Bexar County, Texas). Vaughn took Davis into custody, and Davis was subsequently indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon.
Vaughn stated that he spoke to Davis out of concern for Davis’s safety:
Q: And why did you advise him to come to the median?
A: Because where he was walking was – you’re either in the road or you’re in the grass, and he was – the particular area he was in, the traffic is coming downhill. So he would be walking uphill. So it wouldn’t take anything for a vehicle to hit him where he was at.
Q: And you weren’t going to talk to him in the road, were you?
A: Absolutely not.
Q: So would you consider that you were checking on his welfare?
A: Absolutely.
Q: And for safety reasons you asked him to step into the median?
A: Correct.
Vaughn also stated that based on his past experiences with motor vehicle deaths on the interstate, Davis’ walking in the middle of the interstate was “definitely a danger to him” (Davis). Vaughn testified that it would not take long for a vehicle to hit him. Vaughn continued that the entire encounter lasted no longer than thirty minutes. Vaughn also testified that Davis voluntarily spoke to him and cooperated with his requests. Lastly, Vaughn testified that “welfare checks” were commonly undertaken by officers who observed people walking on the interstate for many different reasons.
On cross-examination, Vaughn was asked about the specific timing of his conversation with Davis:
Q: Because the timing is crucial. He walked past your car and kept walking, according to your report, and you ordered him to come back to you, to stop and come back?
A: Well, I said “Stop. Come to the median and talk to me,” yes sir.
Q: So would a reasonable person believe that he needed to stop and come back?
A: It’s possible, yes –
Q: I mean, if an officer gives you a directive, don’t you think a reasonable person is going to do what they asked you to do?
A: I would say that a reasonable person would stop and come back.
Vaughn also testified that the “welfare check” ended when he observed the bulge in Davis’s pants, asked Davis what it was, and asked Davis if he could remove it. Lastly, Vaughn stated that he did not have reasonable suspicion that Davis had committed any crime prior to speaking with Davis and that if Davis decided to walk away, he would not have charged Davis with additional crimes.
The trial court entered an order denying Davis’s motion to suppress. He was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced to five years. On appeal, he argued that the gun should have been suppressed. MCOA affirmed.
Analysis
Mississippi courts have divided police activity in preventing crime, detecting violations, making identifications, and apprehending criminals’ into three types of action: (1) voluntary conversations, (2) investigative stops and temporary detentions, and (3) arrests. See MCOA Harrell. In an investigatory stop, an officer may stop and detain a person to resolve an ambiguous situation without having sufficient knowledge to justify an arrest. See MSC Stewart. Under appropriate circumstances, a law enforcement officer may be fully justified in providing assistance without needing any reasonable basis to suspect criminal activity. See MSC Trejo. This is known as the community caretaking function.
The State argues that Vaughn’s actions were justified as part of his community caretaking function (Vaughn admitted that he had no reason to believe that Davis had or was committing a crime, and the trial court denied Davis’s motion to suppress based on Vaughn’s community caretaker function authority, so we need not engage in a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity analysis).
The concept of the community caretaking function originated in SCOTUS Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). SCOTUS upheld the warrantless search of a police vehicle towed to a private garage following a drunk-driving accident, reasoning that law enforcement’s concern for public safety, specifically the risk of a revolver falling into unauthorized hands, justified the search under the community caretaking doctrine, even though it led to the discovery of bloodied items and ultimately a murder charge against the officer involved.
MSC adopted the community caretaking function in Floyd, where an off-duty officer received a report from a third party who told him that a vehicle was traveling at high speed in a reckless manner. The officer called in the description of the vehicle, and an on-duty officer pulled the vehicle over even though that officer had not personally observed any violation of traffic laws. The officer observed an open bottle of vodka on the seat, and ultimately, Floyd was charged, tried, and convicted of driving under the influence. MSC stated that reasonable cause for an investigatory stop may be based on an officer’s personal observation or on an informant’s tip if it bears indicia of reliability. However, the Supreme Court acknowledged the community caretaking function and emphasized law enforcement’s need to perform investigatory activity to protect the public: The public concern served by the seizure is evident—a reckless driver poses a mortal danger to others. There exists in such a situation an absolute necessity for immediate investigatory activity. The severity of the interference with individual liberty was minimal—Floyd was required to pull over to the side of the road. Officer Palmer had a duty to investigate the detailed complaint given to the police department concerning a driver who may have been ill, impaired, reckless, or dangerous to the public.
In MSC Trejo, they acknowledged that it had adopted the community caretaking function in Floyd and discussed the concept in more detail and how courts should apply it. In that case, a police officer pulled Trejo over because of his concern that the driver may have been intoxicated or tired, not because of any traffic violation. Subsequently, law enforcement discovered cocaine strapped to Trejo’s girlfriend’s body. MSC reversed the conviction, noting that the community caretaking function in Cady may apply in contexts other than inventory searches, as the police provide many functions apart from investigating criminal activity. But only under appropriate circumstances may a law enforcement officer be fully justified in stopping a vehicle to provide assistance, without needing any reasonable basis to suspect criminal activity. The Court stated that the ultimate standard is reasonableness. When examining the reasonableness of Trejo’s stop, the Court noted that the facts did not establish that Trejo was in any need of help. Trejo was driving well above the minimum speed limit of 45 miles per hour and under the maximum speed limit of 70 miles per hour; there was no evidence of erratic driving; no traffic prevented the officer from passing Trejo in the right lane, and the fact that a failure to change lines “isn’t necessarily indicative of distress.” MSC also noted, as this court did, that Trejo immediately pulled over as the officer flashed his blue lights, suggesting that he was unaware rather in distress. Accordingly, MSC held that the community caretaking function did not justify the officer’s initial stop. The Court held that the facts presented at the suppression hearing did not justify a reasonable belief that Trejo needed help or that the public was endangered, and as such, the trial court should have granted Trejo’s motion to suppress.
In our case, considering the totality of the circumstances, we find that Vaughn’s stopping of Davis was a justified safety stop under the community caretaking function. Vaughn testified that he saw Davis walking along I-55 at 3:00 a.m. in the darkness of the morning and felt Davis needed help. In light of the 70-mile per-hour speed limit, Vaughn testified that “it wouldn’t take anything” for a vehicle to hit Davis, who was walking uphill in a lane of traffic heading downhill. Vaughn also relied on his experience as an officer, noting the many motor vehicle accident deaths he’s worked and noting that the hills in the area where Davis was walking made it a very dangerous area to be walking in the roadway. Because of these circumstances, Vaughn said he wanted to check on Davis’s welfare.
Vaughn testified that he spotted Davis walking in the middle of the road, sweating profusely. Vaughn waited for Davis to walk by the patrol vehicle and saw a knife in Davis’s pocket. Vaughn asked Davis where he was going, to which Davis answered, “Illinois,” and continued walking without further explanation, passing by Vaughn entirely. At this point, Vaughn felt compelled to inquire about Davis’s safety even further and told Davis to stop and come to the median and talk to him, to which Davis complied. Considering the totality of the circumstances—the time of the morning, Davis’s physical appearance, the hundreds of miles he was attempting to walk along a major interstate, the dangerousness of the area, and the ambiguous nature of the encounter, it was reasonable for Vaughn to believe that Davis needed help.
We caution, however, that the community caretaking function is not meant to extend law enforcement’s authority to stop people randomly claiming “safety concerns.” Reiterating Trejo, we follow our Supreme Court’s instruction to carefully analyze the totality of the circumstances, so that the community caretaking function is cautiously and narrowly applied in order to minimize the risk that it will be abused or used as a pretext for conducting an investigatory stop and search for criminal evidence. We do so by examining the totality of the circumstances on a case-by-case basis.