Facts
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On the afternoon of June 27, 2020, Texas City police officers Matthew Bonner and Veronica De la Garza attempted to execute an arrest warrant for Mato Lopez at Three Stars Harbor restaurant, a waterfront property owned by Lopez’s father, Nikola Lupis. When Officers Bonner and De la Garza arrived, they found Lupis standing outside the restaurant. Officer Bonner approached Lupis and asked, “Are you Mato Lopez?” Lupis replied that he was Lopez’s father and that Lopez had just left on a boat. Lupis then asked Officer Bonner why he was looking for Lopez. Officer Bonner told Lupis that he had a warrant for Lopez’s arrest on an assault charge.
Officer Bonner then warned Lupis of the consequences of concealing and harboring a fugitive. Lupis denied that Lopez was on the property and began to walk away. Officer Bonner asked Lupis if he had any form of identification on him, and Lupis turned around with his arms spread wide open and replied “no.” Officer Bonner told Lupis to “calm down” and that he was conducting an investigation and needed some form of identification to ascertain who he was talking to. Lupis then turned back around and began walking towards his parked car to get his identification. Officer De la Garza then immediately told Lupis they only needed his name and date of birth and ordered him to “stay here.” Lupis complied.
After this, Officer Bonner went to his patrol car, while Officer De la Garza stayed with Lupis. Lupis then walked behind the gate on his business’s property and tried to close the gate. Officer De la Garza removed her taser from its holster, threatened that she would tase Lupis, and grabbed the gate handle to hold the gate open. Officer De la Garza then told Lupis that he was being detained. Lupis was then handcuffed and placed into the back of Officer Bonner’s patrol car. Approximately six minutes after placing Lupis in Officer Bonner’s patrol car, Officer De la Garza opened the door of the patrol car, and Lupis informed him that his handcuffs were tootight and that he could not breathe. The officers, however, kept Lupis in the vehicle.
Soon thereafter, Lupis’s wife arrived and gave the officers permission to search the property. Lopez was not found. When the officers returned to the car, approximately seven minutes later, Lupis was trembling, sweating, and gasping for air. Lupis urged Officer Bonner to call an ambulance. An ambulance soon arrived and transported Lupis to a hospital.
Lupis alleged that he was unlawfully detained. The District Court granted qualified immunity. The 5th affirmed.
Analysis
To state a claim for unlawful detention, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a detention occurred; and (2) the detention was not based on reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity was occurring. See Coons.
A. Detention occurred
Lupis meets the first prong of the unlawful detention claim because Officer De la Garza’s command to “stay here” while Officer Bonner verified Lupis’s identity constituted a seizure. When a claimed seizure lacks physical force, we must analyze the encounter in two steps: whether the officer exerted a sufficient show of authority; and whether defendant submitted to it. See Wright.
To determine whether an officer exerted a sufficient show of authority, we employ the “free to leave” test from SCOTUS United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). In Mendenhall, the SCOTUS held that a person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure . . . would be . . . the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled. However, when an individual has no desire to leave, such as when he is on his own property, the appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.
No seizure occurs when police ask questions of an individual, or ask to examine the individual’s identification. If an officer, however, conveys a message that compliance with their requests is required, then a seizure has occurred.
Officer De la Garza’s command to “stay here” exerted a sufficient show of authority. By instructing Lupis not to move, Officer De la Garza intended to place a restraint on his liberty. Moreover, upon receiving this instruction, Lupis remained still—submitting to that show of authority. A reasonable person in Lupis’s position would not feel free to decline the officer’s request to stay still or terminate the encounter. Lupis therefore was detained and meets the first prong of the unlawful detention claim.
B. Detention was based on reasonable suspicion
Lupis does not meet the second prong of the unlawful detention claim, however, because the officers had reasonable suspicion to briefly detain him.
A Terry stop like the one at issue here is a brief detention used by officers to investigate suspected criminal activity. To justify a Terry stop, an officer needs reasonable suspicion. To establish reasonable suspicion, the officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. Terry stops must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time.
In this case, the relevant period for the assessment of whether the officers had reasonable suspicion is the moments leading up to the seizure—the time at which Officer De la Garza ordered Lupis to “stay here.” A seizure must be justified at its inception.
During these pre-seizure moments, Officers Bonner and De la Garza approached Lupis’s property to execute an arrest warrant after receiving a call indicating that Lopez’s truck was at the property. Upon seeing that the vehicle was, in fact, on the property, they approached Lupis. Because the officers were lawfully present at Lupis’s establishment, they were entitled to engage with him in a consent-based encounter. And they did. They asked Lupis if he was Lopez. Lupis replied that he was Lopez’s father and that Lopez had just left on a boat.
Lupis then asked Officer Bonner why he was looking for Lopez, and Officer Bonner explained that he had a warrant for Lopez’s arrest on an assault charge. Lupis again denied that Lopez was on the property, stated that he would not repeat himself anymore, and began to walk away. Officer Bonner then asked Lupis if he had any form of identification on him. Lupis turned around, with his arms and hands spread wide, and answered, “No. Officer Bonner then told Lupis that he needed to provide some form of identification, so that Officer Bonner could verify to whom he was speaking. Lupis turned and began walking toward his parked vehicle.
It was at this point that the seizure occurred: Officer De la Garza told Lupis that they only needed his name and date of birth and ordered him to “stay here.” Lupis then stopped, as ordered, and stated his name and date of birth. The sequence of events leading up to the seizure establishes that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Lupis so that they could ascertain whether he was the fugitive they sought. The officers approached Lupis at his business establishment, where they had just found Lopez’s car—a place where Lopez plausibly could have been found. When the officers spoke to Lupis, Lupis asserted that he was not Lopez, stated that he did not want to repeat that fact, and began to walk away toward a vehicle, maintaining that he did not have identification on his person. It is not inconceivable that a fugitive wishing to escape detection would engage in such behavior. We conclude that these are specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted the officers stopping Lupis so that they could ascertain his identity.
To be clear, individuals who are not detained are not required to provide identifying information to police. See Johnson. But we have previously held that it is reasonable for an officer to ask to speak to the target of an arrest warrant at a residence and then to request identification from the person to whom they speak so that they can confirm that they are arresting the correct person. See Roberts. We held this even in light of the well established principle that the area around the home is intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically, and is where privacy expectations are most heightened. Consequently, we conclude that it is also permissible for an officer to request identification from a person who reasonably could be the target of an arrest warrant and is attempting to walk away from officers toward his vehicle outside of a business establishment, where privacy expectations are weaker.
Officer safety considerations, which the Supreme Court has stated are both legitimate and weighty, are pivotal to this conclusion. See SCOTUS Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977). Ordering Lupis to stand with the officers for a minute or two while they confirmed whether he was the fugitive they sought was a minimal intrusion that minimized risk of harm to the officers, because it prevented Lupis from moving to an area of the property where he could have concealed a weapon. Furthermore, Lupis was not handcuffed or physically restrained in any way. The officers’ command to “stay here” was the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officers’ suspicion in a short period of time.
Because the officers’ detention of Lupis was based on reasonable suspicion, the district court did not err by granting the officer’s motion to dismiss Lupis’s unlawful detention claim.
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/unpub/23/23-40445.0.pdf