Facts
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Samantha Lee-Ann Sealey paid a late-night visit to a 7-Eleven in San Antonio, Texas. A police officer with a warrant for Sealey’s arrest met her in the parking lot with handcuffs. When the officer turned his back, she made a break for it. In a foot chase, the officer drew close and Sealey fell face-first onto the pavement, her hands still cuffed behind her back. Sealey says that she was shoved and brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of her Fourth Amendment rights. The district court concluded that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed Sealey’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Sealey appeals. We AFFIRM.
Analysis
A. Constitutional Violation
An officer violates the Fourth Amendment when an arrestee suffers an injury that results directly and only from a clearly excessive and objectively unreasonable use of force. Because police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments, we must not critique their actions with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. Instead, the test is objective reasonableness. To that end, a plaintiff must allege what a reasonable officer would have done under the circumstances. Sealey did not.
Sealey’s complaint states that Officer Mancias violated her Fourth Amendment rights when he unnecessarily pushed her, rather than using the appropriate level of force, de-escalating the situation and apprehending her without inflicting serious physical injuries. But reasonableness does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of alternative less intrusive means. Accepting Sealey’s allegations as true, Officer Mancias’s split second decision to use force was reasonable to apprehend a suspect in active flight. Sealey does not specify what superior alternative he had. By failing to do so, she has failed to plausibly allege a Fourth Amendment violation.
B. Clearly Established
Even if Sealey alleged a constitutional violation, it would not be clearly established. The clearly established inquiry is especially demanding for excessive force claims. The right may not be defined at a high level of generality because the question is whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established. Rights are clearly established when existing precedent squarely governs the specific facts at issue, not when a rule is merely suggested by then-existing precedent.
Sealey asserts a right that prohibits an officer from viciously pushing her to the concrete ground while evading arrest. But she identifies no controlling authority or robust consensus of persuasive authority suggesting that this right is of a constitutional dimension. Instead, each case she cites recognizes a different right. Sealey chiefly relies on SCOTUS Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). At most, Garner prohibits using deadly force against an unarmed burglary suspect fleeing on foot who poses no immediate threat. And Garner did not address whether a vicious shove amounted to deadly force. So, Garner is of no help.
Sealey’s circuit cases fare no better. See Singleton, Aguirre, and Mason. She cites those authorities for the proposition that Officer Mancias’s conduct constituted an obvious constitutional violation under Garner. Sealey has identified no judicial opinion—and we have found none—involving even remotely similar facts to those presented here which would’ve placed Officer Mancias on notice that his conduct violated a constitutional right. Nor does the rule of Garner, discussed above, and that case’s progeny impel the conclusion that an officer may not shove a fleeing suspect to the ground. Therefore, accepting Sealey’s account of the facts, this case falls short of the sky high standard of obviousness. Because Sealey’s proffered right was not clearly established, the district court properly concluded that Officer Mancias was shielded by qualified immunity and dismissed the § 1983 claim against him.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/unpub/24/24-50998.0.pdf