Facts
(If you are new to 1983 actions, click here for help)
Trooper Donald Hinote resides in a high-crime neighborhood plagued by burglaries. In fact, Hinote’s patrol car had previously been burglarized twice while parked in his driveway. On the night of the incident in question, Hinote’s vehicle was burglarized for a third time. The facts are as follows: Hinote returned from a late shift and fell asleep in a chair. Around 1:30 am, 17-year-old Ronald Elizondo broke into Hinote’s personal vehicle and stole a hatchet. Elizondo then broke into a second vehicle belonging to Hinote’s neighbor that was parked in front of Hinote’s house.
Meanwhile, Hinote had been awakened by a security alarm. He checked his security camera feed and noticed that the lights were on in his vehicle. Realizing that his car had been burglarized yet again, Hinote grabbed his personal handgun and ran outside. Hinote first checked his truck to confirm no one was inside. He then noticed the lights in his neighbor’s car were on.
Hinote approached the vehicle, noticed that someone was inside, and called “Hey, get out of there!” Before Hinote could identify himself as a police officer, Elizondo turned and ran directly toward Hinote. In that moment, Hinote saw an object in Elizondo’s hand that Hinote believed to be a weapon. Hinote discharged his firearm, hitting Elizondo three times. Hinote then called 911 and administered first aid. But Elizondo died after reaching the hospital.
After his death, Elizondo’s parents sued Hinote, arguing that his use of force was unreasonable under the circumstances and barred by clearly established law. Hinote asserted qualified immunity and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted Hinote’s motion, ruling that Hinote’s use of force was not unreasonable and did not violate clearly established law. The 5th affirmed.
Analysis
Clearly established prong
Here, the cases proffered by the Elizondos are factually inapposite and thus could not possibly have provided Hinote with fair notice that his conduct was unlawful.
The Elizondos first argue that SCOTUS Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), clearly establishes that Hinote’s actions were unreasonable. In Garner, the Supreme Court established that the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable. But Garner dealt with the reasonableness of shooting an unarmed suspect running away from an officer—not a seemingly armed suspect charging directly at the officer. Thus, Garner is materially distinguishable and fails to clearly establish that Hinote’s actions were unreasonable.
The Elizondos next proffer Lytle. In Lytle, an officer fired at a fleeing suspect’s vehicle as the suspect drove away, accidentally hitting a passenger in the vehicle. The court upheld the district court’s denial of summary judgment to the officer, reasoning that a jury could find the officer’s actions unreasonable because it is unclear how firing at the back of a fleeing vehicle some distance away was a reasonable method of addressing the threat. But like Garner, the facts of Lytle differ meaningfully from those present here. The Lytle suspect drove away from the officer, and Elizondo charged directly at Hinote. Thus, Lytle does not clearly establish that Hinote’s actions were unreasonable.
Nor does the Elizondos’ next case, Cole. In Cole, multiple officers followed a suicidal individual who was walking along a highway holding a firearm to his head. Officers shot the suspect without warning. This court affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment to the officers as to qualified immunity. But Cole in no way mirrors this case. In Cole, as in Garner and Lytle, there’s no indication that the suspect charged directly at an officer. But here Elizondo ran directly at Hinote from a short distance away while holding an object that Hinote could have reasonably believed in the darkness to be a firearm. Thus, Cole too fails to provide the “near-analogous facts” necessary to clearly establish the law.
To the extent the Elizondos rely on Mason, their arguments fail. Mason involved drastically different facts than those here. In Mason, officers shot a suspect in his home following a tense altercation with multiple other individuals in the residence. But here, as the court has already repeated at length, Hinote encountered Elizondo alone and clearly instructed him to step away from the car. Elizondo instead charged directly at Hinote.
Thus, the Elizondos have proffered no case that remotely establishes that Hinote’s actions were unreasonable. Hinote is entitled to qualified immunity. Ronald Elizondo’s death was unquestionably a tragedy—but not one for which Trooper Hinote may be held liable. Trooper Hinote’s actions did not violate clearly established law. As such, he is entitled to qualified immunity. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/unpub/25/25-40007.0.pdf