Facts
Detective Jeff Scroggins of the Livingston Parish Sheriff’s Office believed that Quwinton Norman was supplying methamphetamine to a narcotics distributor, Fleet Wallace. Scroggins applied for search warrants for Norman’s apartment, where Norman had conducted a drug transaction with Wallace, and a nearby house, where Norman spent the night after the transaction. Scroggins’s two-and-a-half-page affidavit in support recounted the investigation and included summaries of text messages between Norman and Wallace and observations of Norman’s activities at each location. A Louisiana state court judge issued both warrants.
Officers then searched the house and Norman’s vehicle, which was in the garage at the time. They found large amounts of drugs, about $64,000 in cash, and other incriminating items. Norman was indicted on federal charges of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and cocaine. He moved to suppress the evidence found at the house, arguing that the affidavit in support of the warrant failed to establish probable cause and was bare bones. The district court held a hearing and granted the motion. The 5th reversed.
Analysis
Because the evidence at issue was obtained pursuant to a search warrant, first, we determine whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. Under that exception, evidence obtained by officers in objectively reasonable good-faith reliance upon a search warrant is admissible, even though the affidavit on which the warrant was based was insufficient to establish probable cause.
The good-faith exception does not apply if the affidavit in support of the warrant is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. Such bare bones’ affidavits contain wholly conclusory statements, which lack the facts and circumstances from which a magistrate can independently determine probable cause. Simply put, bare-bones affidavits do not detail any facts, they allege only conclusions.
Norman argues, and the district court held, that Scroggins’s affidavit was bare bones because it did not provide facts showing a nexus between the house and evidence of Norman’s drug distribution. Facts in the affidavit must establish a nexus between the house to be searched and the evidence sought. The nexus may be established through direct observation or through normal inferences as to where the articles sought would be located. In the good-faith context, we ask whether officers objectively could reasonably believe that there was such a nexus.
Here, Scroggins’s affidavit was not bare bones. Rather than containing wholly conclusory statements, it provided the following “facts and circumstances” relevant to the required nexus. First, the text messages between Wallace and Norman indicated that Wallace was purchasing large quantities of narcotics from Norman, several times a week. The texts told Wallace to meet Norman “at his apartment, his residence, and nearby locations to purchase illicit narcotics.”
Second, after a drug transaction with Wallace, Norman drove directly to the house at issue and pulled into the garage, and no one was seen leaving that night. Third, the day after the drug deal, Norman drove from the house to his apartment twice within one hour in the vehicle he used for the drug deal. He also continued traveling between the apartments, the residence, and to other nearby locations. Fourth, officers saw one of Norman’s known associates arrive at the house in a car believed to be used by Norman and referenced in the texts to Wallace.
Given these facts, officers could reasonably rely on the state judge’s conclusion that there was a nexus between evidence of Norman’s drug trafficking and the house. The state judge could draw reasonable, common-sense inferences from the affidavit. Here, Norman presumably had the proceeds from the drug transaction with him at the house that night. Thus, it was reasonable to infer that those proceeds were likely in the house or its garage. It was also reasonable to infer that the “residence” referenced in the texts with Wallace was probably the house at issue.
Scroggins’s affidavit presented sufficient facts for the state judge to draw reasonable inferences and make an independent probable-cause determination. It was not a bare-bones affidavit, so the good-faith exception applies. And because the good-faith exception applies, our analysis ends and we need not reach the question of probable cause.
For the reasons stated above, we REVERSE the district court’s order excluding evidence obtained from the house and the vehicle and REMAND for further proceedings.
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/24/24-30294-CR0.pdf