Facts
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In April 2023, while conducting surveillance, officers with the Houston Police Department observed Dontel Thompson rob a store at gunpoint. Thompson left the store and entered a nearby neighborhood. Officers soon located Thompson and attempted to make contact. Two officers exited a vehicle and approached Thompson from the side, one of them exclaiming: “Put your hands up. Get on the ground. When approached, Thompson, gun in hand, fled in Officer Devin Inocencio’s general direction. Inocencio exited the vehicle he was in at about the same time as the other officers. After exiting the vehicle and identifying Thompson, Inocencio told Thompson: “Put your f***ing hands up.” Thompson, still grasping his handgun, was running in the direction of Inocencio and at least one other officer. Within moments of telling Thompson to put his hands up, Inocencio began firing at Thompson. Thompson later died due to his injuries.
Jenkins sued Inocencio, individually and on behalf of Thompson’s estate, under § 1983 for Inocencio’s alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court summarily denied Inocencio’s motion. The 5th reversed.
Analysis
On appeal, Inocencio contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity. We agree. We begin (and end) with the alleged violation of a constitutional right. In a case such as this, the relevant Fourth Amendment questions are whether the force was excessive and unreasonable as judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.
The video shows that Inocencio could have reasonably believed that Thompson posed a serious physical threat to another officer or Inocencio himself. The reasonableness inquiry is inherently factbound, making the video of this event critical. The video, which includes views from multiple officers’ bodycams, shows that, just after committing an armed robbery, Thompson: fled from officers when they attempted to make contact; ignored numerous commands to either put his hands up or get on the ground; ran in the direction of Inocencio and at least one other officer; held a gun in one hand (or the other) during the entire duration of his flight; and came within only a few feet of Inocencio during this flight. Moreover, the video also clarifies that Inocencio began to shoot at Thompson when Thompson was only a few feet in front of Inocencio and the core of the incident lasted only 11 seconds.
What is more, even when Thompson passed Inocencio, while Inocencio continued to shoot Thompson, Thompson was still running toward at least one other officer and further into a neighborhood. These circumstances clarify that Inocencio could have reasonably believed that Thompson posed a serious physical threat justifying the use of deadly force. Jenkins’s arguments to the contrary are without merit.
For instance, Jenkins contends that Thompson did not pose a threat of serious physical harm because, in part, he did not point or raise a weapon at any officer or other person, made no furtive moves or gestures, and did nothing indicating he was going to use a weapon against any officers or others. But we cannot agree. In fact, we have rejected such an argument, focusing on a litigant’s failure to identify any basis for second-guessing an officer’s split-second judgment that a fleeing, armed suspect could turn a gun on him at a moment’s notice.” See Wilson.
Jenkins’s reliance on Ramirez is also of no moment. Ramirez’s and this case’s facts are quite dissimilar. The question in Ramirez was whether the continued use of deadly force was reasonable while Ramirez fled from officers after an initial engagement and a pause in the engagement. Not so here. There was no similar pause in the engagement. But more importantly, unlike Ramirez, the video shows that Inocencio shot at Thompson, who held a gun in his hand, while Thompson was in front of and running toward Inocencio and continued to engage Thompson as he was running past Inocencio in the direction of another officer.
For the forgoing reasons, Inocencio is entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of Inocencio’s motion to dismiss and RENDER judgment for Inocencio.
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/unpub/25/25-20326.0.pdf