Facts
After seeing a stolen pickup truck on Dustin Siegert’s property, law enforcement officers applied for and obtained a search warrant to search Siegert’s property, 8977 Deer Trail, for the truck, keys to the truck, and other instruments potentially associated with the theft such as cell phones. The warrant permitted the search of the entire premises, including inside Siegert’s home.
Eight officers entered the property to execute the warrant, and two conducted an initial protective sweep of the home prior to locating Siegert. Upon entering the home, officers noticed a strong smell of marijuana and observed drugs and drug paraphernalia in plain view. While the two officers searched the inside of the home, officers outside located Siegert in his yard and seated him on the tailgate of a truck near the front of his home. Siegert and the officers talked for approximately ten minutes. Upon the officers’ prompting, Siegert and the officers conducted a brief walkthrough of the home, where Siegert identified hidden guns and drugs. Siegert was returned to his seat on the tailgate of the truck, and officers then conducted a more thorough search of the home. After the search, Siegert was handcuffed, placed in a police car, and for the first time read his Miranda warnings.
The search of the home yielded two firearms, ammunition, methamphetamine, marijuana, a drug ledger, and drug paraphernalia. Officers additionally seized 180 grams of methamphetamine from Siegert’s car and four cell phones on Siegert’s person that contained evidence of drugs, guns, and stolen property. Unbeknownst to officers at the time of the search, the stolen truck was not on Dustin Siegert’s property. Instead, it was just over the property line on his father Rick Siegert’s adjacent lot. Viewed together, Siegert’s and his father’s properties form a twenty-acre rectangle abutting a road, Deer Trail Run, to the north of the property. Dustin Siegert’s property is an approximately one-acre square carved out of the northwest corner of his father’s land. Siegert’s home is in the middle of his one-acre lot, and his property is bordered by fencing commonly used to manage the movement of livestock on rural property, and further subdivided by similar fencing within those lines.
The father’s property is empty except for a barn just on the other side of the livestock fence surrounding Siegert’s one-acre plot. A large livestock gate in the fence between the two properties was kept open, and there is a well-worn vehicle path between the father’s barn and Siegert’s home through the gate. When asked for his address by officers, Siegert stated “8977 Deer Trail Run.” The two properties share one driveway and one mailbox on Deer Trail Run, with “8977” written on its side. To the immediate right of the driveway is Siegert’s home. To the immediate left of the driveway and just through the gate and well-worn path is his father’s barn, accessible only through Siegert’s property. The truck was found near the barn on his father’s property, just outside Siegert’s property on the other side of the livestock fence.
Siegert was charged with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of methamphetamine and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The district court denied Siegert’s motion to suppress evidence found pursuant to the search and statements he made during law enforcement questioning. The 5th affirmed.
Analysis
A. Warrant and false statement
We engage in a two-step review of a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant: (1) whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies; and (2) whether probable cause supported the warrant. We need not reach the issue of probable cause if the good faith exception applies.
Siegert argues that the affidavit included a false statement because it incorrectly alleges that the truck would be found on Defendant’s property, when the truck was, in fact, across the property line of Defendant’s father’s adjacent land. However, the affidavit does not claim that the truck would be found on Siegert’s property. Instead, it describes the premises to be searched and states that Dustin Siegert is the person who controls the location.
Even if the search warrant did contain a false statement, it was not made intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth. Agent Hutzler testified that he conducted surveillance on the property for approximately one hour. Given the open gate, the lack of significant fencing, and that the father’s property was accessible only through the well-worn path on Siegert’s property, Hutzler testified he definitely believed Siegert had full access to both properties. Hutzler testified he only later found out Siegert’s dad owned part of it. Given the layout of the two properties, the district court did not commit clear error when it concluded that Agent Hutzler did not act intentionally or recklessly.
B. Particularity of warrant
Siegert argues that because the affidavit states only that the stolen White Ford F250 was taken to 8977 Deer Trail Run, but the truck was not located on the specified area to search, the warrant was not sufficiently particular. The warrant described with significant specificity the property and residence to be searched, enabling officers to with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended. The same officer who conducted surveillance authored the affidavit and executed the search, limiting the danger of a random search. The object of the search authorized was clear. Further, the officers acted reasonably and in good faith in assuming the search warrant covered both Siegert’s and his father’s land as one property. From all outward appearances there was only one property, not two. The officers acted in objectively reasonable good faith in relying on the warrant.
C. Warrant was not bare boned
Bare bones’ affidavits contain wholly conclusory statements, which lack the facts and circumstances from which a magistrate can independently determine probable cause. Siegert argues that the affidavit’s assertion that the truck’s keys and that cell phones with evidence of theft could be found on the property is conclusory.
But the affidavit plainly does not allege only conclusions. It explains in detail the circumstances from which law enforcement located the stolen truck on Siegert’s property. It states that, while conducting surveillance from the roadway, an officer was able to see the white Ford F250 and confirm through communications that the white Ford F250 was stolen. The affidavit states the affiant knows through experience that those who buy and sell stolen property often utilize cell phones to facilitate stolen property transactions. It further explains that it is common for stolen cars to be accompanied by keys to that car.
D. Protective sweep
The protective sweep of Siegert’s home was permissible. Two officers conducted a brief initial search of the residence immediately upon entry onto Siegert’s property. Siegert argues that the district court erred when it held that the officer’s protective sweep was lawful. We need not decide whether the search falls within the protective sweep doctrine because the warrant permitted a complete search of Siegert’s residence. Once a valid warrant is issued, the officer’s subjective intent in conducting the search is irrelevant, whether that be initially for officer safety or later for evidence of criminal activity.
E. Consent not needed
Siegert’s consent was not necessary for officers to conduct a lawful search of his home. When officers act, as here, pursuant to a valid search warrant issued on probable cause, the ensuing search is reasonable.
F. Miranda
Siegert’s statements to officers were not the product of a custodial interrogation. Siegert made a variety of incriminating statements to police while seated on the tailgate of a pickup truck in his yard shortly after the police entered the property. Siegert admitted to the presence of guns and drugs in his house, which police later found with Siegert’s help. The conversation lasted approximately ten minutes. Siegert was not handcuffed. One officer, Agent Hutzler, questioned Siegert while two other officers stood nearby. Siegert contends that his incriminating statements should be suppressed because they were made before he received Miranda warnings.
Siegert’s un-Mirandized statements warrant suppression only if they were the product of a custodial interrogation. They were not. A suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes when placed under formal arrest or when a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood the situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement to the degree which the law associates with formal arrest.
While no fact is dispositive, this court generally considers (1) the length of the questioning, (2) the location of the questioning, (3) the accusatory, or non-accusatory, nature of the questioning, (4) the amount of restraint on the individual’s physical movement, and (5) statements made by officers regarding the individual’s freedom to move or leave.
First, the questioning was brief and lasted approximately ten minutes.
Second, the location of the questioning does not suggest that Siegert was subject to a custodial interrogation. The questioning occurred in Siegert’s front yard within view of the public road in broad daylight.
Third, the nature of the questioning was not sufficiently accusatory to suggest that a reasonable person in Siegert’s position would have equated it with formal arrest. When informed about the search warrant, Siegert told officers, I’ll work with you. Siegert told officers that another individual had brought the stolen truck to his property, which prompted officers to ask, for example, “who brought it” and “why did they bring the truck?” Officer Hutzler asked, “is there anything else stolen on your property besides the truck?” After seeing drugs in plain view, Officer Hutzler asked, “Is there any more dope? . . . I don’t want to tear your place up. I want you to go in there [and show me] . . . This is how I’d rather it go. This is your house. I’m not here to destroy your stuff. You’re going to walk in there with me and show me where all that dope is.” Officer Hutzler asked if Siegert had guns on the property and stated,“we’ll have to check on the guns because you are a felon.” Siegert replied,“you know I can’t legally have the guns.” The tenor of the questioning never became accusatory, much less threatening.
Fourth, Siegert’s physical movements were minimally restrained. Here, the agents never handcuffed or otherwise physically restrained Siegert’s movement. Nor was Siegert initially forced onto the tailgate or moved to a secondary location prior to the questioning. Siegert was not subject to a physical restraint comparable to formal arrest.
Fifth, officers did not explicitly suggest that Siegert was free to leave, nor did they suggest he was not free to leave. When Siegert asked the officers if they were going to “get out of [his] hair,” Agent Hutzler responded that it “depends on what you got . . . how much you got in there . . . let’s see what you got and go from there. Also, officers acting pursuant to a valid search warrant for contraband may temporarily detain the home’s occupants, as such a brief detention is significantly less intrusive than an arrest. See SCOTUS Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
Considering the totality of the circumstances, Agent Hutzler’s brief colloquy with Siegert does not rise to the level of a custodial interrogation and therefore Siegert’s statements should not be suppressed.
https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/unpub/23/23-50907.0.pdf